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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
36
Sec, et NOP'ORl\1
Chapter 1
On 19 November, the day after Seaberg's briefing, the final deci
sion on the CL-282 came at a luncheon hosted by Air Force Secretary
Talbott. The participants-Dulles and Cabell from the CIA; Gardner,
Ayer, and General Putt from the Air Force; Kelly Johnson; and Edwin
Land-all agreed "that the special item of material described by
Lockheed was practical and desirable and would be sought. ... It was
agreed that the Project should be a joint Air Force-CIA one but that,
regardless of the source of the funds, whether AF or CIA. CIA
unvouchered channels would be needed to pass the funds.,,,,.,
It is interesting to note that Lockheed, which had originally de
veloped the CL-282 on its own and had devoted considerable effort to
promoting it, had to be persuaded to undertake the project in
November 1954 because the company had become heavily committed
to several other civilian and military projects. When Kelly Johnson
received a call from Trevor Gardner on l 7 November asking him to
come to Washington for conversations on the project, his instructions
from Lockheed's senior management were ''to not commit to any
program during the visit, but to get the information and return."
When he returned to California, Johnson noted in his project log that
"I was impressed with the secrecy aspect and was told by Gardner
that I was essentially being drafted for the project. It seemed, in fact,
that if I did not talk quietly, I might have to take a leave of absence
from my job at Lockheed to do this special project." 05 Of course,
Kelly Johnson did not need to be drafted or persuaded into undertak
ing such a bold step forward in aircraft design. He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which they did after meeting with Johnson when he returned
to California on the evening of I 9 November.
Four days later, on 23 November, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) approved DCI Dulles's request to undertake the
CL-282 project. The following day Dulles signed a three-page mem
orandum, drafted by DDCI Cabell. asking President Eisenhower to
approve the overhead reconnaissance project. That same afternoon, at
a meeting attended by the Secretaries of State and Defense and senior
Air Force officials. Dulles and Cabell presented the document to the
"" Charles Pearre Cabell, Memorandum for the Record...Luncheon Meeting with the
Secretary of the Air Force,.. 19 November 1954. in OSA History. chap. 2, annex 4 (TS
Codeword).
"" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 17 and 19 :-.:ovember 1954.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.