Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“The Advance”34 pages
35 over DCI Dulles, but a project of this magnitude also required the support of the Air Force. Some Air Force officials, however, feared that a decision to build the CL-282 might jeopardize the Air Force's own RB-57 and X-16 projects. Just one month earlier, in October 1954, the Wright Air Development Command had appealed to the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar gued that the Bell X-16 was a better design because it was more air worthy than the CL-282 and could be used throughout the Air Force in different types of missions because it had two engines, wheels, and an armor-plated, pressurized pilot's compartment. If 157 engines were diverted to the CL-282, the appeal to General Putt warned, there would not be enough of these popular powerplants to meet the needs of the X-16 prograrn.62 Having heard of the Wright Air Development Command attack on the CL-282, Allen Donovan of the Intelligence Systems Panel met with General Putt on 19 October to argue in favor of the Lockheed design. This discussion led General Putt to meet with 15 scientists from the Technological Capabilities Panel on 18 November 1954 to discuss the merits of the four proposed reconnaissance aircraft. Also present as a briefer was Maj. John Seaberg from the Wright Air Development Command, who later recalled: What I did was present the results of my comparative analysis of all four designs. I showed the relative high altitude performance capabilities of all four. I pointed out that aerodynamically the Bell, Fairchild, and Lockheed designs were close. Martin '.s B-57, being a modification, was not quite as capable. I stated that, in my opinion, the 173 [General Electric engine] would not be good enough to do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I overlaid a curve showing that with the 157 [Pratt & Whitney en gine} installed, it would then be competitive with the Bell and Fairchild designs. 63 This meeting-along with the knowledge that President Eisenhower also supported the CL-282-helped win over the Air Force. To be on the safe side, however, the Air Force did not abandon the X-16 program until the Lockheed aircraft had begun flying . •, Donovan interview (S). •-' Quoted in Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 13. ~eeret NOF6ftr<J Chapter 1 Secret
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.