Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“The Pentagon”12 pages
34 Sec, et NOFORN Chapter 1 The letter had two attachments: a two-page summary of a com plete operational plan for organizing, building, and deploying the CL-282 within a period of 20 months at a cost of $22 million and a three-page memorandum, entitled "A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence." Aware of Dulles's preference for classical intelligence work, the Project Three memorandum stressed the superi.ori.ty of the CL-282 program over traditional espionage methods: We believe that these planes can go where we need to have them go efficiently and safely, and that no amount offragmentary and indirect intelligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to such positive information as can thus be provided. 60 The Land committee memorandum also stressed the need for the CIA to undertake such reconnaissance missions rather than the Air Force, noting that "For the present it seems rather dangerous for one of our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight." The committee members also listed the advantages of using the CL-282 rather than an Air Force aircraft: The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of present Russian interceptors and high enough to have a good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light (15,000 pounds), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even if through some remote mischance it were detected and identi fied_ 61 One additional advantage of the Lockheed design over the Air Force's proposed high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was a faster completion time. Kelly Johnson had promised the Land committee that his aircraft would be flying by August 1955, just eight months after he proposed to start construction. The Bell X-16 prototype was not scheduled for completion before the spring of 1956. The strong advocacy of Killian and the other scientists on the various advisory committees concerned with overhead reconnais sance, combined with President Eisenhower's support, finally won "'' Memorandum for DCI Allen F. Dulles from Project Three Panel, "A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence," 5 November 1954, p. 3 (TS, downgraded to S) in OSA History, chap. I, annex I (TS Codeword). •• Ibid. &eaFet
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.