Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design." Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …19 On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional source of support was…
  • p. 42 …it. A lthough Land had heard Allen Donovan '' James R. Killian. Jr.. interview by Donald E…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory…
  • p. 69 …staff) flew over Nevada with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Battin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermarnn Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a '·wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 …The committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this meeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
33
Secret NOfiORN
Chapter 1
to do so because the Land committee was part of a panel commis
sioned by President Eisenhower to examine the nation's intelligence
community and recommend changes. The committee thus had a direct
line to the White House through James Killian's contacts there:
Early in November 1954, Land and Killian met with President
Eisenhower to discuss high-altitude reconnaissance. Killian's mem
oirs contain an account of this crucial meeting:
Land described the [CL-282] system using an unarmed plane and
recommended that its development be undertaken. After listening to
our proposal and asking many hard questions, Eisenhower ap
proved the development of the system, but he stipulated that it
should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not
become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department
or troubled by rivalries among the services. 58
The scientists from the advisory committees and the President
were thus in agreement that the new reconnaissance program should
be controlled by the CIA, not the military.
- ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282
Meanwhile Edwin Land and his Project Three colleagues were work
ing to convince Allen Dulles that the CIA should run the proposed
overflight program. On 5 November Land wrote to the DCI strongly
urging that the CIA undertake the CL-282 project:
Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think
overflight is urgent and presently feasible. I [Land] am not sure
that we have made it clear that we feel there are many reasons
why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force
assistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action
and technique that is right for the contemporary version of
CIA: a modem and scientific way for an Agency that is always
supposed to be looking, to do its looking. Quite strongly, we
feel that you must always assert your first right to pioneer in
scientific techniques for collecting intelligence-and choosing
such partners to assist you as may be needed. This present op
portunity for aerial photography seems to us a fine place to
start. 59
" Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, p. 82. The exact date of the meeting cannot
be detennined, but it occurred during the first half of November 1954.
,. Letter, Project Three Panel to DCI Allen F. Dulles, 5 November 1954, in OSA History,
chap. I, annex I (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.