Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Donald A. Johnson”17 pages
30 Sec, et NOFORM Chapter 1 briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the 24-25 May meeting of Baker's Intelligence Systems Panel, he did not realize that that plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same. As soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the CL-282 drawing. however, he telephoned Baker to say, ·•Jim, l think l have the plane you are after." 50 A few days later, when Land showed Kelly Johnson's conceptual drawing to Baker and the other Project Three members, they all be came enthusiastic about the aircraft's possibilities. Although Baker had heard Allen Donovan ·s brief mention of the Lockheed design in May, he had not yet seen a drawing of the aircraft because Donovan did not report to the ISP on his early-August trip to Lockheed until 24 September. After seeing the CL-282 drawing, Baker began designing a camera and lens system that would fit in the Lockheed craft. 51 At the end of August, Land discussed the CL-282 with Allen Dulles's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard Bissell, who came away from the meeting without any definite ideas as to what Land wanted to do with the aircraft. Overhead reconnais sance was not uppermost in Bissell's mind at the time, and it was un clear to him why he had even been contacted.51 Bissell's outstanding academic credentials, his acquaintanceship with James Killian through his previous teaching experience at MIT, and his direct access to DCI Dulles may have led the Technological Capabilities Panel members to consider him the best CIA point of contact. Although surprised that he had become involved in the CL-282 project, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he could about reconnaissance systems. In early September 1954, Bissell had Douglas E. Ashford, a young Air Force officer on his staff, put together a general status report on air reconnaissance pro grams. Bissell forwarded the 16-page study to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), Lt. Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF, on 24 September. In a covering memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's '" Baker interview (S). " Ibid. '' Bissell interview (S). iaeret
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.