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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

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“Nevers”34 pages

p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…

t
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Set1et NOl'ORN
Chapter 1
wingroot areas to withstand the hi.gh speeds and sharp turns man
dated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much
weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail
plane wing.
In short, it was possible to achiieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000
feet, but only by making certain that al l parts of the aeronautical
equation were in balance: thrust, !lift. and weight. T he only plane
meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's
CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the
CL-282 did not have to meet the S[Pecifications of a combat aircraft
because it could fly safely above Soviet fighters.....
Donovan's arguments convince:d the Intelligence Systems Panel
of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the ·
A ir Force, which had already rejectc:d the CL-282. Thus, even though
the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by
September I954-the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and
high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these back
ers were all connected with the Air !Force. They could not offer funds
to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 c,oncept because the Air Force was
already committed to the Martin RB -57 and the Bell X- I6. Additional
support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282
project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on
high-level advisory committees.
The Technological Capabilities Panel
The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned
over the capability of the Soviet Un,ion to launch a surprise attack on
the United States. Early in 1954, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed
by a RAND Corporation study waming that a Soviet surprise attack
might destroy 85 percent of the SAC bomber force. Gardner then met
with Dr. Lee DuBridge, Presiden t of the Cal ifornia Institute of
Technology and Chairman of the Office of Defense Mobilization 's
Science Advisory Committee, and criticized the committee for not
deal ing with such essential problems as the possibility of a surpri se
attack. This criticism led DuBridge to invite Gardner to speak at the
Science Advisory Committee's next meeting. After l istening to
" Donovan interview (S); Baker in1erview (S}.

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.