Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
t 26 Set1et NOl'ORN Chapter 1 wingroot areas to withstand the hi.gh speeds and sharp turns man dated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail plane wing. In short, it was possible to achiieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000 feet, but only by making certain that al l parts of the aeronautical equation were in balance: thrust, !lift. and weight. T he only plane meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the CL-282 did not have to meet the S[Pecifications of a combat aircraft because it could fly safely above Soviet fighters..... Donovan's arguments convince:d the Intelligence Systems Panel of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the · A ir Force, which had already rejectc:d the CL-282. Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September I954-the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these back ers were all connected with the Air !Force. They could not offer funds to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 c,oncept because the Air Force was already committed to the Martin RB -57 and the Bell X- I6. Additional support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282 project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on high-level advisory committees. The Technological Capabilities Panel The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned over the capability of the Soviet Un,ion to launch a surprise attack on the United States. Early in 1954, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed by a RAND Corporation study waming that a Soviet surprise attack might destroy 85 percent of the SAC bomber force. Gardner then met with Dr. Lee DuBridge, Presiden t of the Cal ifornia Institute of Technology and Chairman of the Office of Defense Mobilization 's Science Advisory Committee, and criticized the committee for not deal ing with such essential problems as the possibility of a surpri se attack. This criticism led DuBridge to invite Gardner to speak at the Science Advisory Committee's next meeting. After l istening to " Donovan interview (S); Baker in1erview (S}.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.