Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

24
Sec, et NOFOAP~
Chapter 1
Allen F. Donovan
Baker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force's
Intelligence Systems Panel in late April 1954 but could not tell its
members about the British overflight of Kap~stin Yar because they
were not cleared for this information . The panel did. however. discuss
the modi fications for high-alti tude flight being made to the US
Canberra, the B-57."
The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282
The next Intell igence Systems Panel meeting took place on 24 and 25
May at Boston University and the Polaroid Corporation. Panel mem
ber Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory eval
uated the changes bei ng made to the B-57 by the Martin Aircraft
Company. Even wichout Martin 's specifications or drawings,
Donovan had been able to estimate what cou ld be done to the 8-57 by
lengthening the wings and l ightening the fuselage. He had determined
that alterations to the B-57 airframe would not sol ve the reconnais
sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically,
he explained to the panel. any multiengine aircraft built accordiing to
military specifications. including the B-57. would be too heavy to fly
above 65,000 feet and hence would be vulnerable to Soviet intercep
tion. To be safe, Donovan explained, penetrating aircraft would need
10 fly above 70,000 feet for the entire mission.':
Developme nt of such an aircraft was already under way.
Donovan continued. for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed a lightweight, high-fly
ing aircraft. ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel t9
southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design and gather ideas
on high-altitude aircraft from other aircraft manufacturers.
When he was finally able to make this tri p in late summer,
Donovan found the plane that he and the other ISP members had. been
seeking. On the afternoon of 2 August 1954. Donovan met wiith L.
Eugene Root. an old Air Force acquai ntance who was n,ow a
Lockheed vice-president. and learned about the Air Force's competi
tion for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Kelly Johnson then
showed Donovan the plans for Lockheed's unsuccessful entry. A life
long sailplane enthusiast. Donovan im mediately recognized that the
.,: Donovan interview (S); Baker interview (S).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.