Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
23
See1 et NOFOftN
Chapter 1
The wide variety of programs discussed at the conference were
all products of the Air Force's all-out effort to find a way to collect
intelligence on the Communist Bloc. Some of the schemes went be
yond the existing level of technology; others, like the camera-carrying
balloons, were technically feasible but involved dangerous political
consequences.
British Overflight of Kapustin Var
The British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance air
craft. In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN,
which was designed to modify the Canberra bomber for high-altitude
reconnaissance. This project was probably inspired by Richard
Leghorn's collaboration with English Electric Company designers in
195 I, when they calculated ways to increase the altitude of the
Canberra. The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with Rolls
Royce Avon-109 engines and gave it long, fuel-filled wings. The
range of this variant of the Canberra was now 4,300 miles, and, on
29 August 1955, it achieved an altitude of 65,880 feet.n
Sometime during the first half of 1953, the RAF employed a
high-altitude Canberra on a daring overflight of the Soviet Union to
photograph the missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Because of ad
vanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelli
gence, the overflight did not catch the Soviet Union by surprise.
Soviet fighters damaged and nearly shot down the Canberra.")
Rumors about this flight reached Washington during the summer of
1953, but official confirmation by the United Kingdom did not come
until February 1954. While on a six-week tour of Europe to study
aerial reconnaissance problems for the US Air Force's Scientific
Advisory Board, James Baker was briefed by RAF intelligence offi
cials on the Canberra overflight of the Soviet Union. On 22 and 23
March 1954, he reported on it to the full Scientific Advisory Board
at Langley AFB, Virginia.
'" Van der Aart, Aerial Espionage, p. 18; Philip G. Strong, Chief, Operations Staff. OSI.
Memorandum for the Record. "Meeting of Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 18-21
October 1953," 26 October 1953, OSI (OS WR) records, job 80R-0 1424, box I (TS,
downgraded to S).
~, Stewart Alsop, The Center, (New York: Popular Library. 1968), p. 194; Beschloss,
Mayday, pp. 78-79. Both of these books state that the project included the CIA. but there
is no evidence to support this assertion.
GeeFot

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.