Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
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Appendix E
Project AXILLARY AXILLARY
While Project AQU ILINE was still under development, its chief aero
dynamicist, Charles N. Adkins, left the program because he believed
that its escalating costs wou ld prev,ent it from ever producing a de
ployable aircraft. He wanted to build a small. inexpensive re
mote-controlled aircraft to test a low-cost lightweight autopilot
currently being developed by ·oRD. Under a $5,000 time-and-materi
als contract with Melpar. Incorporatt:d. Adkins hired a local model
aircraft builder to assemble and modify a standard Hawk-750 glider
kit and power it with a rear-mounted engine and pusher propeller.
Following a series of successful test flights. Adkins installed a small
camera and took a number of aerial photographs.
By this time the effort to build a "Miniature Multi-Purpose
Airborne Vehicle" had become known as Project AXILLARY.
Melpar, Inc., received a second contract for $50,000 to install ORD's
autopilot in the aircraft. and the projject managers now began search
ing for a use for their vehicle. The two main possibilites were ( I) as a
short-range reconnaissance veh icle for use in a peace-monitoring or
intelligence-gathering system and (2) as a short-range warhead deliv
ery system. In 197 1 the Office of Special Activities evaluated
AXILLARY flight-testing and determined that the small model air
craft was not suitable for use as a covert reconnaissance vehicle be
cause of its large radar cross secition and significant accoustical
signature. The aircraft's radar signature made it potentially useful as a
weapons systems, however. ORD suggested that AXILLARY be
equipped with a radar-homing unitE which would
make it an inexpensive means for .----;---.--..---~ - ~ ---..JJ
surface-to-air missile systems in North Vietnam. T he Director of

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.