Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design." Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …19 On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional source of support was…
  • p. 42 …it. A lthough Land had heard Allen Donovan '' James R. Killian. Jr.. interview by Donald E…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory…
  • p. 69 …staff) flew over Nevada with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Battin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermarnn Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a '·wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 …The committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this meeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
341
or more of the aircraft was always being repaired, and eventually
three of the five AQUILINE prototypes were destroyed in testing.
Although AQUILINE's visual and accoustic signatures were
very small, its radar cross section continued to cause problems. The
radar cross section at low frequencies was less than one-tenth of a
square meter, giving it a radar signature smaller than that of an eagle,
but there were flares in the VHF region that increased the likelihood
of detection.
Studies indicated that the radar cross section problems could
eventually be reduced to acceptable levels, but the greatest weakness
of the AQUILINE project was its navigational system. AQUILINE
did not have a programmable autopilot; it had to be flown by remote
control from the ground. Once the aircraft flew over the horizon. all
navigational commands had to be relayed to it by high-flying aircraft.
A DC-6 loitering at 25,000 feet would give AQUILINE a range of
250 nautical miles: use of a U-2 at 70,000 feet could increase this to
350 nautical miles.
- -Such a range was suitable for the targets originally conceived for
AQUILINE, but the need for intelligence on targets located much
dee er in the Soviet Union and the Peo le's Re ublic of China
and the development time and costs for
~~~~~-c---~
AQUILINE began to soar. By l971 ORD had spent six years and $33
million on AQUILINE but still had many important problems to re
solve.
At this point the project was turned over to the Office of Special
Activities for operational testing at Area 51 in Nevada. Flight tests
showed the aircraft to be successful by the standards originally set for
the project in l 967, as it flew l 30 miles and obtained very high reso
lution photography of a target before returning successfully to the
original launchsite. However, improving AQUILINE sufficiently to
make it a practical long-range reconnaissance system was estimated
to cost another $35 million and take two to three years. On the recom
mendation of DDS&T Carl Duckett on I November l 971, Project
AQUILINE was canceled. The project's aircraft and equipment were
eventually transferred to the US Army for use in a battlefield manage
ment system known as AQUILA, which has yet to be deployed be
cause of continuing developmental problems.
Sectet NOfORN
Appendix E
Sec.et

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.