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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
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Sec, et NOfiOF\l'fJ
Appendix C
APPENDIX C
Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2
From the beginning the U-2 was envisioned as more than a camera
platform. In fact, the U-2 would ultimately carry only five types of
photographic equipment but more than 20 different types of electronic
devices, some for collecting electronic intelligence (ELINT), others
("ferret" equipment) for gathering intelligence on foreign radars, and
a few for self-protection--electronic countermeasures to defeat en
emy missile-control radars.
The various electronic, countermeasures and intelligence-gather
ing systems designed for the U-2 received designations using Roman
numerals-Systems I through XXII. The first seven devices were
built by the Ramo-Wooldridge firm, now part of the TRW
Corporation. System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect
ground-controlled intercept and air defense signals. Weighing only
7. 7 kilograms, this system was aboard all U-2s from I 955 through
1959. System-IL a communications and navigation system. never
worked properly and was canceled. System-III. a 16-kilogram VHF
recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used
and was transferred to the Navy in 1958. System-IV, a ferret device
that recorded electromagnetic energy in the 150- to 4,000-MHz range
was used on 16 missions between 1957 and 1959, when it was given
to the Air Force. System-V was similar to System-I but covered nine
wave bands. The device was so heav·y that U-2s using it could not
carry a camera system. System-V was used on only three missions
and was replaced by the lighter weight System-VI that covered the P-,
L-, S-, and X-band frequencies and could be used with either the A or
B camera. System-VI was used from 1959 through 1966.
The growing need for data on Soviet missile development led to
a contract with the firm of Haller-Raymond-Brown (HRB) to build a
missile-telemetry intercept system as quickly as possible. The result
ing device (System-VII) could record up to 12 minutes of data from
six simultaneous frequencies. This unit first saw service on 9 June
1959 and was used on another 22 missions during the next year.
Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the
Navy, the designation was changed to System-VIII.
System-IX was an electronic-countermeasures (ECM) device for
generating false-angle information in response to X-band radar pulses
from surface-to-air missile radars. Also known as the Mark-30. the
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.