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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
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6ee1 et NOFORN
Appendix B
Secaet
KIEFER, Eugene P.
An Air Force officer with a degree in aeronautical engineering who in
1953 informed a friend at Lockheed of the Air Force's search for a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, thus, leading to the initial de
sign of the CL-282. After leaving the Air Force, Kiefer became
Richard Bissell's technical adviser for the OXCART and
photosatellite programs.
KILLIAN, James R., Jr.
President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Killian
headed a high-level and very secret study of the nation's ability to
withstand a surprise attack. While this project was still under way, he
and Edwin Land persuaded President Eisenhower to support the de
velopment of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. Later,
Killian headed Eisenhower's Board of Consultants for Foreign
Intelligence Activities, served as his Cabinet-level science adviser,
and chaired the President's Science Advisory Board. Killian was also
chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board un
der John F. Kennedy.
LAND, Edwin H.
An extremely talented inventor famous for the development of polar
izing filters and the instant-film camera. Land also devoted consider
able time and energy to voluntary government service. During World
War II, Land worked for the Radiation Laboratories, and after the war
he served on numerous Air Force advisory panels. As the head of the
Technological Capabilitites Panel's study group investigating US in
telligence-gathering capabilities, Land became a strong advocate of
the development of a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (the
CL-282) under civilian rather than Air Force control. Land and James
Killian persuaded President Eisenhower to approve the U-2 project
and later the first photosatellite project. Land also served on the
President's Board of Consultants for Foreign Intelligence Activities.
LEGHORN, Richard S.
An MIT graduate in physics, Leghorn joined the Army Air Force in
I 942 and went to work for reconnaissance expert Col. George
Goddard. By the time of the invasion of Europe, Leghorn was chief of
reconnaissance for the 9th Tactical Air Force. After the war, Leghorn
began preaching the need for "pre-D-day" reconnaissance in order to
gather intelligence on the Soviet Bloc. He returned to the Air Force
during the Korean war and later worked for Harold Stassen 's
Disarmament Office. In 1956 he became the head of the Scientific

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.