Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 225 …By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course of events…
  • p. 251 …Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de velop a high…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986. ---. The Soviet…
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Sec, el NOFORN
Chapter 7
PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE U-2 PROGRAM
From the very beginning of the overflight project, US Allies provided
valuable support. Bases in Germany, Turkey, Norway, and Pakistan
played a major role in overflights of the Soviet Union. Bases in India,
Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines greatly assisted operations in
Asia. Two Allies-the United Kingdom and Nationalist China-made
an even greater contribution to the U-2 program by providing pilots
and conducting overflights. British pilots began flying in late 1958
and conducted two important overflights of the Soviet Union in late
1959 and early 1960. After the end of such missions in May 1960, the
need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew
only training or ferry missions, although their use for operational mis
sions was considered on several occasions.
The end of overflights of the Soviet Union reduced the impor
tance of British participation but resulted in the addition of a new
source of pilots when the focus of interest for the U-2 in its strategic
intelligence-gathering role shifted to the People's Republic of China.
The United States and Nationalist China had been conducting joint
r~<;onnaissance projects over the Chinese mainland since the
mid- l 950s, and in 1961 the CIA equipped the Nationalist Chinese
with the latest in reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. For the next 12
years, Agency U-2s with Nationalist Chinese pilots brought back
large quantities of information on the development of Communist
China's armed forces, nuclear technology, and economy. Such
information was extremely important to US policymakers. Nationalist
China paid a high price in lives for its participation in the U-2
program: seven pilots died (five in training accidents and two on
overflights), and another three were captured.
U-2s AS COLLECTORS OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
The low level of mission activity over the project's original target
the Soviet Union-was initially very frustrating for CIA project man
agers, but the U-2 soon found new missions not originally envisioned
for the program. With its strategic-intelligence-collection role often
on hold, the U-2 became highly useful as a collector of tactical intelli
gence during crisis situations.
Beginning with the Suez Crisis of 1956 and continuing with sub
sequent Middle Eastern wars, a rebellion in Indonesia, Sino-Indian
border fighting, and culminating in support to the growing US
-ieerct

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.