Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Canberra”11 pages
319 Sec, el NOFORN Chapter 7 PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE U-2 PROGRAM From the very beginning of the overflight project, US Allies provided valuable support. Bases in Germany, Turkey, Norway, and Pakistan played a major role in overflights of the Soviet Union. Bases in India, Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines greatly assisted operations in Asia. Two Allies-the United Kingdom and Nationalist China-made an even greater contribution to the U-2 program by providing pilots and conducting overflights. British pilots began flying in late 1958 and conducted two important overflights of the Soviet Union in late 1959 and early 1960. After the end of such missions in May 1960, the need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew only training or ferry missions, although their use for operational mis sions was considered on several occasions. The end of overflights of the Soviet Union reduced the impor tance of British participation but resulted in the addition of a new source of pilots when the focus of interest for the U-2 in its strategic intelligence-gathering role shifted to the People's Republic of China. The United States and Nationalist China had been conducting joint r~<;onnaissance projects over the Chinese mainland since the mid- l 950s, and in 1961 the CIA equipped the Nationalist Chinese with the latest in reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. For the next 12 years, Agency U-2s with Nationalist Chinese pilots brought back large quantities of information on the development of Communist China's armed forces, nuclear technology, and economy. Such information was extremely important to US policymakers. Nationalist China paid a high price in lives for its participation in the U-2 program: seven pilots died (five in training accidents and two on overflights), and another three were captured. U-2s AS COLLECTORS OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE The low level of mission activity over the project's original target the Soviet Union-was initially very frustrating for CIA project man agers, but the U-2 soon found new missions not originally envisioned for the program. With its strategic-intelligence-collection role often on hold, the U-2 became highly useful as a collector of tactical intelli gence during crisis situations. Beginning with the Suez Crisis of 1956 and continuing with sub sequent Middle Eastern wars, a rebellion in Indonesia, Sino-Indian border fighting, and culminating in support to the growing US -ieerct
Not linked to a story yet.
Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.