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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

Open the PDF at page 331 Original source ↗

“Sea”42 pages

  • p. 16 …An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also…
  • p. 38 …off to about 6 percent of its sea-level thrust. Finally, low structural load factors, like…
  • p. 62 …U-2 landing gear and pogos .Sea,et-
  • p. 69 …chap. 8, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20. Sea,at
  • p. 75 …a boiling point of 300°F at sea level. Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts…
  • p. 80 …pounds heavier and delivered only 10.200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting Secret
  • p. 89 …that they could not be flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air…
  • p. 98 …Sec.el NOfOftN Chapter 2 Sea,et
  • p. 102 …working on a cover story for over seas operations. It was important to have a plausible…
  • p. 115 North Sea First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 ) f\ Sweden .__,_,_"-.. ) ~ STOCICHOUil -~ ✓ vf!.Sea \f Finland…
  • p. 116 r/ o/ North Sea 1/'. AMSTERDAM ;, 0 0 Baltic S<la --- Mission 2013 4 July - - - Mission…
  • p. 120 …Black SEia ~ q, TurkE~Y ~ ~111~ 13~ • ? ~ ...• o<) Mediterranean Sea () .. •• •,,, Malta (U.K.) Sec, et NOFORN ...... . . .. ·:. ·.•
  • p. 131 Mission 1316, 1 November 1956 Turkey Cyprus ', (U.K .) '· Mediterranean Sea lncirlik Airbase _/\ o/ t. </ \ f…
  • p. 139 …Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System…
  • p. 146 …On 31 July, the same aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. There were a…
  • p. 148 …was the first to photograph the major Soviet space launch facility east of the Aral Sea…
  • p. 153 …of Soviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea. The final overflight of Detachment A , mission 2040…
  • p. 154 …K~ome<e,, tOO 200Miles Norwegian Sea Barents Sea Kola Peninsula '1'v Sweden f / Finlaind…
  • p. 155 …Norwegian radars tracked the overflights of the Barents Sea and Murmansk in October 1957, and Col…
  • p. 157 …well within international airspace above the Black Sea, as was the case on 27 October I957…
  • p. 158 …it turned abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to 110,000…
  • p. 166 …the Soviet border and over the Black Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as…
  • p. 179 Baltic ~a Finland Black Sea Tu • ' -···1~- ..... ;.. :~.: ~~~~ •' :~·f.:~<,,· ·ir.fa 0 First British Overflight, 6 December…
  • p. 185 …Because the Bodo airfield was involved in NATO maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea area…
  • p. 215 …Caribbean Sea W- Caymanlsl"""5 I_U."-i ~,...~ _''-),.,, .";!:-, - Mission 3086 5 August Mission 3088 29 August…
  • p. 216 …Caribbean Sea lOOKiloml.it•~ 100 200 Mff.-s Guvtof Mex~co \\\ I \ Caribbean Sea Multiple missions…
  • p. 225 …forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against the rebel-held areas in…
  • p. 226 f. 0 0 IND/AN OCEAN 300 -- 300 IIOOMlloo .·' Philippine Sea
  • p. 240 …Philippine Sea South China Sea Philippines • SeGFet NOFOAl<J 72<1~ (IU)0428J 4o92
  • p. 248 …6eeret NOFORN Chapter 5 Sea,et
  • p. 257 …The use of peripheral missions prevented any further losses, although one aircraft crashed into the sea…
  • p. 288 275 Settee NOPORN Chapter 6 Radar testing of A-72 mockup Sea,et
  • p. 316 …Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12 would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the…
  • p. 317 …2 would be flying farther out to sea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs…
  • p. 350 …B B Afghanistan, Tashkent, Tyuratam, Kazalinsk, Aral Sea 11 August 1957 4039 McMurray Lahore B B…
  • p. 351 …A-2 Dushanbe, Tashkent, Tyuratam, Kazalinsk, Aral Sea 10 September 1957 4059 Hall Adana B A…
  • p. 369 …AQUILINE 304, 339-343 Arabs 256 Aral Sea 135 Arbenz, Jacobo 16 "Archangel-I" 262 "Archangel…
  • p. 371 358 &ee,et NQFQRN Index Baltic Sea 3, 303 Baltic states 104 Baltimore; Maryland 6, 9…
  • p. 373 …186, 201, 205, 208-209, 299, 327 Caspian Sea 126 catheterized 64 cathode-ray tube 267…
  • p. 382 …23-24, 109, 139, 143, 164 Kara Sea 142 Kazakh language 135 Kazakhstan 135 Kazan', Soviet…
  • p. 385 …301 mechanical fuel totalizer/counters 68 Mediterranean Sea 114, 116. 121, 140, 142, 153 medium-range…
  • p. 393 …Pennsylvania 222 Sea of Japan 3 Seaberg, John 8-9. 12. 35-36. 333 SEAFOAM 211…
318
See. et NOFORN
Chapter 7
The U-2 program not only provided information on individual
Soviet weapons systems, but also helped analysts assess basic Soviet
intentions, particularly during crisis situations, as Dulles wrote in
May 1960:
Whenever the international situation becomes tense because of
a problem in some particular area, we are concerned whether
the situation might get beyond control-that someone on the
other side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war. ...
Our knowledge of Soviet military preparations, however, result
ing from the overflight program. has given us an ability to dis
count or call the bluffs of the Soviets with confidence. We have
been able to conclude that Soviet statements were more rhetori
cal than threatening and that our courses of action could be
carried through without serious risk of war and without Soviet
interference.4
Dulles closed his report on the U-2's accomplishments by put
ting the program in perspective as part of the entire national intelli
gence effort, noting that "in terms of reliability, of precision, of
access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has
been unique. And in the opinion of the military, of the scientists and
of the senior officials responsible for our national security it has been,
to put it simply. invaluable."
The impact of the U-2 overflights on international relations is
harder to measure. On the one hand, the intelligence they gathered
was a major factor in keeping the United States from beginning a
costly and destabilizing arms race in the late 1950s and early 1960s
by showing that the Soviet Union was not engaged in major buildups
of strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. On the
other hand, violations of Soviet airspace by U-2s strained relations
with Moscow at times and led to the collapse of the 1960 summit
meeting. On balance, however, the impact of the U-2 on superpower
relations was positive. Without the intelligence gathered by the U-2,
the Soviet Cnion's strategic military capabilities would have
remained a mystery, making it very difficult for the President to resist
pressure from the military, the Congress, and the public to carry out
major increases in strategic weapons, which would have poisoned
relations with the Soviet Union far more than the small number of
overflights did.
' Ibid.. pp. 9- IO (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.