Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Nevers”34 pages
317 The ·'bomber-gap" controversy was soon followed by a "mis sile-gap" controversy, provoked by an extensive Soviet propaganda campaign that claimed a substantial Soviet lead in developing and deploying ICBMs. U-2 missions searched huge stretches of the Soviet Union along the rail network, looking for ICBMs deployed outside the known missile testing facilities. These missions enabled the CIA to conclude, as Dulles explained to Congress in May 1960, that "the Soviet ICBM program has not been and is not now a crash program; instead, it is an orderly, well-planned, high-priority program aimed at achieving an early ICBM operational capability." 3 As with the controversy over Soviet bomber strength, information from U-2 photography enabled President Eisenhower to resist pressure to ac celerate the US missile deployment program by building obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles rather than waiting to complete the develop ment of more reliable solid-fueled missiles. U-2 missions also gathered considerable data on the Soviet Union's atomic energy program, including the production of fission able materials, weapons development and testing activities, and the location and size of nuclear weapons stockpile sites. Such. U-2 pho tography also revealed no evidence that the Soviet Union had violated the nuclear testing moratorium. One of the greatest contributions of the U-2 program was to in crease the capabilities of the US deterrent force. Before the U-2 over flights, most target information was based on obsolete materials dating back to World War II or shortly thereafter. With the assistance of U-2 photography, the Defense Department could allocate weapons and crews more efficiently and identify many new targets. U-2 photos also proved invaluable in determining the precise location of targets. One further contribution to the capabilities of the US deterrent force was the information that U-2s collected on the Soviet air defense sys tem. U-2 photography located Soviet fighter airfields and gained in telligence on new fighter models. Special electronic intercept and recording equipment carried on many U-2 missions enabled the CIA to analyze the technical characteristics, operational techniques, and radar order of battle of the Soviet Union's electronic defenses. This information was vital both for planning the routes for US deterrent forces and for developing electronic countermeasures. ' Ibid.. p. 3 (TS Codeword). Secret ~OFORl<J Chapter 7 -Scc,er
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.