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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 225 …By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course of events…
  • p. 251 …Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de velop a high…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986. ---. The Soviet…
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Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 1
scientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming
into the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the
leaders of the West. Only two months before the successful hydrogen
bomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin. And,
at the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc seemed bent on causing dissen
sion between Western Europe and the United States and between the
developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign
policy. combined with advances in nuclear weapons, led officials such
as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a
menace to peace and world order.
The Soviet Union's growing military strength soon became a
threat not just to US forces overseas but to the continental United
States itself. In the spring of 1953. a top secret RAND study pointed
out the vulnerability of the SAC's US bases to a surprise attack by
Soviet long-range bombers.-'•
Concern about the danger of a Soviet attack on the continental
United States grew after an American military attache sighted a new
Soviet intercontinental bomber at Ramenskoye airfield. south of
Moscow, in 1953. The new bomber was the Myasishchev-4, later
designated Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than the
turboprops of Russia's other long-range bombers. the Bison appeared
to be the Soviet equivalent of the US B-52. which was only then
going into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow
May Day air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intel
ligence community. Unlike several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the
Bison was not a derivative of US or British designs but represented
a native Soviet design capability that surprised US intelligence ex
perts. This new long-range jet bomber, along with the Soviet Union's
large numbers of older propeller and turboprop bombers, seemed to
pose a significant threat to the United States, and, in the summer of
1954, newspapers and magazines began publishing articles highlight
ing the growing airpower of the Soviet Union. Pictures of the Bison
bomber featured prominently in such stories. 1;
" RAND Corporation. Plans Analysis Section. ··V11/11aahi/ity of U.S. Strategic Power to a
Surprise A/lack in /956, .. RAND Special Memorandum No. 15. Santa Monica. California:
the RAND Corporation, April 15, 1953 (TS. dcclassiticd May 1967).
'' "AF Cites Red Bomber Progress," Aviation Week. May .2-t 1954. p. 14; "Is Russia
Winning the Arms Race?, .. US News cmd World Report, June: 18. 1954, 'pp. 28-19;
"Russia Parades Airpower as 'Big Stick'." Aviation Week. June .28. 1954. p. 15; "Red
Air Force: The World's Biggest." Newsweek. August .23, 1954. pp. 28-33.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.