Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Headquarters”22 pages
: ·i·:.,..,., .:, ' . . .• . . .+ • • + . . . .. -: : ,.-·· Conclusion See, el N01'0Afl1 Chapter 7 315 U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION Before the first U-2 overflights in the summer of 1956, project man .agers believed that their aircraft could fly virtually undetected over the Soviet Union. They did not expect this advantage to last very long, however, because they also expected the Soviets to develolP ef fective countermeasures against the U-2 within 12 to 18 rrionths. Recognizing that time was against them, the U-2 project managers planned a large number of missions to obtain complete coverage of the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. At this time, the U-2 program focused solely on the collection of strategic intelligence. Once operations began, however, project managers found them selves operating under severe constraints. Contrary to the CIA's ex pectations, the U-2 could not fl y undetected. Its overflights led to Soviet diplomatic protests and numerous attempts at interception. Not wishing to aggravate the Soviet Union during periods of tension or to harm relations during more favorable intervals. President Eisenhower placed strict limits on overflights, personally authorizing each one and greatly limiting their number. Yet. the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf, he valued the intelligence that the U-2 overflights collected, especially at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union militarily, fi rst in bombers and then in missiles. As a result of the President's ambivalence toward over fl ights, the years 1956-60 were marked by long periods during which no overflights occurred, followed by brief bursts of activity.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.