Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 225 …By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course of events…
  • p. 251 …Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de velop a high…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986. ---. The Soviet…
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Chapter 6
SUMMARY OF THE OXCART PROGRAM
fntended to replace the U-2 as a collector of strategic intelligence, the
OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was
strictly for obtaining tactical intelligence and its photographic product
contributed very little to the Agency's strategic intelligence mission.
By the time OXCART became operational, photosatellite systems had
filled the role originally conceived for it. The most advanced aircraft
of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever
• 11 70
used operatwna y.
The OXCART did not even outlast the U-2. the aircraft it was
supposed to replace. The OXCART lacked the quick-response capa
bility of the smaller craft: a U-2 unit could be activated overnight. and
within a week it could deploy abroad. fly sorties. and return to home
base. The OXCART planes required precise logistic planning for fuel
and emergency landing fields, and their inertial guidance systems
needed several days for programming and stabilization. Aerial tankers
had to be deployed in advance along an OXCART's flight route and
b_e _p.rovisioned with the highly specialized fuel used by the J58 en
gines. All of this required a great deal of time and the effort ·or several
hundred people. A U-2 mission could be planned and flown with a
third fewer personnel.
Although the OXCART program created a strategic reconnais
sance aircraft with unprecedented speed, range. and altitude. the pro
gram's most important contributions lay in other areas: aerodynamic
design, high-impact plastics, engine performance, cameras, electronic
countermeasures, pilot life-support systems, antiradar devices. use of
nonmetallic materials for major aircraft assemblies. and improve
ments in milling, machining. and shaping titanium. In all of these ar
eas, the OXCART pushed back the frontiers of aerospace technology
and helped lay the foundation for future "stealth" research.
"'On 26 January 1967 Kelly Johnson noted in his "Archangel log":
I think buck to /959, beji,re we sturred this airplu11e, to disc11ssio11.1· with Dick !Jis.\'ell
where we seriously considered the problem of 11'/zerlzer there would he one more mum! of
aircraji be}<Jrl! the sute/lites took over. We jointly agreed there would be just one round.
and nor rwo. That seems ro huve heerz a 1·ery accurate evaluariim, as it seems rlrcll JO
SR-71 '.I· !(ive us erwugh overflight recormais.1·a11t·e capahi/iry and we dort 't need tlze adcfi
tional IV Oxcart aircraft.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.