Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
312
6eeret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
Initial storage arrangements for
A-12s at Palmdale
POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO lrHE OXCART
The OXCART was the last high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft pro
duced for the CIA. although the Office of Special Activities did
briefly consider several possible successors to the OXCART during
the mid- I960s. The first of these. known as Project ISINGLASS . was
prepared by General Dynamics to utilize technology developed for its
Convair Division 's earlier FISH proposal and its new F-I I I fighter in
order to create an aircraft capable of Mach ~-5 at I 00,000 feet.
General Dynamics completed its feasibility study in the fall of 1964,
and OSA took no further action because the proposed aircraft would
still be vulnerable to existing Soviet ,countermeasures. In l 965 a more
ambitious design from McDonnell Aircraft came under consideration
as Project RHEINBERRY (although some of the work seems to have
come under the ISINGLASS designation as well). This proposal fea
tured a rocket-powered aircraft that would be launched from a B-52
mother ship and ultimately reach spe:eds as high as Mach 20 and alti
tudes of up to 200,000 feet. Because building this aircraft would have
involved tremendous technical chall.enges and correspondingly high
costs, the Agency was not willing to embark on such a program at a
time when the main emphasis in overhead reconnaissance had shifted
from aircraft to satellites . As a resuilt. when the OXCART program
ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait
ing in the wings-only the veteran U-2.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.