Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design." Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …19 On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional source of support was…
  • p. 42 …it. A lthough Land had heard Allen Donovan '' James R. Killian. Jr.. interview by Donald E…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory…
  • p. 69 …staff) flew over Nevada with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Battin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermarnn Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a '·wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 …The committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this meeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
312
6eeret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
Initial storage arrangements for
A-12s at Palmdale
POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO lrHE OXCART
The OXCART was the last high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft pro
duced for the CIA. although the Office of Special Activities did
briefly consider several possible successors to the OXCART during
the mid- I960s. The first of these. known as Project ISINGLASS . was
prepared by General Dynamics to utilize technology developed for its
Convair Division 's earlier FISH proposal and its new F-I I I fighter in
order to create an aircraft capable of Mach ~-5 at I 00,000 feet.
General Dynamics completed its feasibility study in the fall of 1964,
and OSA took no further action because the proposed aircraft would
still be vulnerable to existing Soviet ,countermeasures. In l 965 a more
ambitious design from McDonnell Aircraft came under consideration
as Project RHEINBERRY (although some of the work seems to have
come under the ISINGLASS designation as well). This proposal fea
tured a rocket-powered aircraft that would be launched from a B-52
mother ship and ultimately reach spe:eds as high as Mach 20 and alti
tudes of up to 200,000 feet. Because building this aircraft would have
involved tremendous technical chall.enges and correspondingly high
costs, the Agency was not willing to embark on such a program at a
time when the main emphasis in overhead reconnaissance had shifted
from aircraft to satellites . As a resuilt. when the OXCART program
ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait
ing in the wings-only the veteran U-2.
5iee,et

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.