Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Edwards Air Force Base”7 pages
310 Secret NOEQBN Chapter 6 In spite of Helms's request and the strength of his arguments, the Bureau of the Budget memorandum was submitted to President Johnson. On 28 December 1966, the President approved the termina tion of the OXCART program by I January l 968. This decision meant that CIA had to develop a schedule for an orderly phaseout of the A- l 2. This activity was known as Project SCOPE COTTON. Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on lO January I 967 that the A- l 2s would gradually be placed in storage, with the process to be completed by the end of January 1968. In May 1967, Vance directed that SR-7ls would as sume responsibility for Cuban overflights by I July 1967 and would add responsibility for overflights of Southeast Asia by I December 1967. Until these capabilities were developed, OXCART was to re main able to conduct assignments on a 15-day notice for Southeast Asia and a seven-day notice for Cuba.67 All these arrangements were made before the OXCART had con ducted a single operational mission, which did not occur until 3 l May I967. In the months that followed the initiation of operations in Asia. the OXCART demonstrated its exceptional technical capabilities. Soon some high-level Presidential advisers and Congressional leaders began to question the decision to phase out OXCART. and the issue was reopened. The CIA contended that the A- l 2 was the better craft because it flew higher, faster, and had superior cameras. The Air Force main tained that its two-seat SR-71 had a better suite of sensors, with three different cameras (area search, spotting, and mapping), infrared de tectors, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT-collection gear. In an ef fort to resolve this argument, the two aircraft were pitted against each other in a flyoff codenamed NICE GIRL. On 3 November 1967, an A-12 and an SR-71 flew identical flight paths, separated in time by one hour, from north to south roughly above the Mississippi River. The data collected during these missions were evaluated by repre sentatives of the CIA, DIA, and other Defense Department intelli gence organizations. The results proved inconclusive. Both photographic systems pro vided imagery of sufficient quality for analysis. The A-12 Type-I camera's 72-mile swath width and 5,000-foot film supply were supe rior to the SR-71 Operational Objective camera's 28-mile swath and ., Minnich. "OXCART Story," p. 31 (S): OSA History, p. 138 (TS Codi:word) . ..See.at
Not linked to a story yet.
Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.