Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Headquarters”22 pages
309 models. The Secretary of Defense rejected this recommendation. pre sumably because the SR-7 l would not be operational by September 1966.""' In July 1966, at the Bureau of the Budget's suggestion, a study group was established to look for ways to reduce the cost of the OXCART and SR-7 l programs. The study group consisted of C. W. Fischer from the Bureau of the Budget, Herbert Bennington from the Department of Defense, and John Parangosky from CIA. The study group listed three possible courses of action: maintain both fleets, mothball the A-12s but share the SR-7ls between CIA and the Air Force, or mothball the A- l 2s and assign all missions to Air Force SR-71 s. On 12 December 1966, four high-level officials met to con sider these alternatives. Over the objections of DCI Helms, the other three officials-Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Bureau of the Budget Director Charles L. Schultze, and Presidential Scientific Adviser Donald F. Hornig-decided to terminate the OXCART fleet. Concerned that this recommendation would strip the CIA of its super sonic reconnaissance capability, Helms then asked that the SR-71 fleet be shared between CIA and the Air Force.'' Four days later. Schultze handed Helms a draft memorandum for the President requesting a decision either to share the SR-71 t1cet be tween CIA and the Air Force or to terminate the CIA capability en tirely. Having just received new information indicating that the SR-71 ·s performance was inferior to that of the A-12. Helms asked for another meeting to review this data. His concern was that the SR-71 could not match the photographic coverage that the A-12 could provide. Only one of the SR-71 's three camera systems was working anywhere near the original specifications, and that was its Operational Objective system which could only photograph a swath 28 miles wide with a resolution of 28 to 30 inches. The A-12's Type-I P-E camera could photograph a swath 72 miles wide with a nadir resolution of 12 to 18 inches and oblique resolution of 54 inches. Thus, the A-l2's camera covered three times as much territory as the SR-71 's camera and did so with better resolution. In addition. the A-12 could fly 2.000 to 5.000 feet hig:her than the SR-71 and was also faster, with a maximum speed of M';ch 3.1 compared with the SR-71 's Mach 3.0."" ~ OSA Hisron. ch:1p. 20. p. 130 (TS Codeword); Minnich. --oXC.-\RT Story:· p. 30 (S). ,. OSA Hiswn: ch:1p. 20. pp. 130-133 (TS Cmkword): Minnich...OXCART Swry:· pp. 30-31 (5). = Minni<:h. '"OXCART Story:· p. 31 (SJ: OS.\ Histon·. pp. 133-13-+ (TS Codeword). Sec, et NOFORM Chapter 6 Sec,et
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.