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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

Open the PDF at page 32 Original source ↗

“Sea”42 pages

  • p. 16 …An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also…
  • p. 38 …off to about 6 percent of its sea-level thrust. Finally, low structural load factors, like…
  • p. 62 …U-2 landing gear and pogos .Sea,et-
  • p. 69 …chap. 8, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20. Sea,at
  • p. 75 …a boiling point of 300°F at sea level. Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts…
  • p. 80 …pounds heavier and delivered only 10.200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting Secret
  • p. 89 …that they could not be flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air…
  • p. 98 …Sec.el NOfOftN Chapter 2 Sea,et
  • p. 102 …working on a cover story for over seas operations. It was important to have a plausible…
  • p. 115 North Sea First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 ) f\ Sweden .__,_,_"-.. ) ~ STOCICHOUil -~ ✓ vf!.Sea \f Finland…
  • p. 116 r/ o/ North Sea 1/'. AMSTERDAM ;, 0 0 Baltic S<la --- Mission 2013 4 July - - - Mission…
  • p. 120 …Black SEia ~ q, TurkE~Y ~ ~111~ 13~ • ? ~ ...• o<) Mediterranean Sea () .. •• •,,, Malta (U.K.) Sec, et NOFORN ...... . . .. ·:. ·.•
  • p. 131 Mission 1316, 1 November 1956 Turkey Cyprus ', (U.K .) '· Mediterranean Sea lncirlik Airbase _/\ o/ t. </ \ f…
  • p. 139 …Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System…
  • p. 146 …On 31 July, the same aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. There were a…
  • p. 148 …was the first to photograph the major Soviet space launch facility east of the Aral Sea…
  • p. 153 …of Soviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea. The final overflight of Detachment A , mission 2040…
  • p. 154 …K~ome<e,, tOO 200Miles Norwegian Sea Barents Sea Kola Peninsula '1'v Sweden f / Finlaind…
  • p. 155 …Norwegian radars tracked the overflights of the Barents Sea and Murmansk in October 1957, and Col…
  • p. 157 …well within international airspace above the Black Sea, as was the case on 27 October I957…
  • p. 158 …it turned abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to 110,000…
  • p. 166 …the Soviet border and over the Black Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as…
  • p. 179 Baltic ~a Finland Black Sea Tu • ' -···1~- ..... ;.. :~.: ~~~~ •' :~·f.:~<,,· ·ir.fa 0 First British Overflight, 6 December…
  • p. 185 …Because the Bodo airfield was involved in NATO maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea area…
  • p. 215 …Caribbean Sea W- Caymanlsl"""5 I_U."-i ~,...~ _''-),.,, .";!:-, - Mission 3086 5 August Mission 3088 29 August…
  • p. 216 …Caribbean Sea lOOKiloml.it•~ 100 200 Mff.-s Guvtof Mex~co \\\ I \ Caribbean Sea Multiple missions…
  • p. 225 …forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against the rebel-held areas in…
  • p. 226 f. 0 0 IND/AN OCEAN 300 -- 300 IIOOMlloo .·' Philippine Sea
  • p. 240 …Philippine Sea South China Sea Philippines • SeGFet NOFOAl<J 72<1~ (IU)0428J 4o92
  • p. 248 …6eeret NOFORN Chapter 5 Sea,et
  • p. 257 …The use of peripheral missions prevented any further losses, although one aircraft crashed into the sea…
  • p. 288 275 Settee NOPORN Chapter 6 Radar testing of A-72 mockup Sea,et
  • p. 316 …Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12 would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the…
  • p. 317 …2 would be flying farther out to sea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs…
  • p. 350 …B B Afghanistan, Tashkent, Tyuratam, Kazalinsk, Aral Sea 11 August 1957 4039 McMurray Lahore B B…
  • p. 351 …A-2 Dushanbe, Tashkent, Tyuratam, Kazalinsk, Aral Sea 10 September 1957 4059 Hall Adana B A…
  • p. 369 …AQUILINE 304, 339-343 Arabs 256 Aral Sea 135 Arbenz, Jacobo 16 "Archangel-I" 262 "Archangel…
  • p. 371 358 &ee,et NQFQRN Index Baltic Sea 3, 303 Baltic states 104 Baltimore; Maryland 6, 9…
  • p. 373 …186, 201, 205, 208-209, 299, 327 Caspian Sea 126 catheterized 64 cathode-ray tube 267…
  • p. 382 …23-24, 109, 139, 143, 164 Kara Sea 142 Kazakh language 135 Kazakhstan 135 Kazan', Soviet…
  • p. 385 …301 mechanical fuel totalizer/counters 68 Mediterranean Sea 114, 116. 121, 140, 142, 153 medium-range…
  • p. 393 …Pennsylvania 222 Sea of Japan 3 Seaberg, John 8-9. 12. 35-36. 333 SEAFOAM 211…
19
Sec. et NOFOAN
Chapter 1
document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated
radical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intel
ligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photo
graphic surveillance: examined the use of passive infrared and
microwave reconnaissance; and discussed the development of ad
vanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommenda
tions called for the development of high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft:
We have reached a period in history when our peacetime knowl
edge of the capabilities, activities and dispositions of a poten
tially hostile nation is such as to demand that we supplement it
with the maximum amount of information obtainable through
aerial reconnaissance. To avoid political involvements, such
aerial reconnaissance must be conducted either from vehicles
flying in friendly airspace, or-a decision on this point
permitting-from vehicles whose performance is such that they
can operate in Soviet airspace with greatly reduced chances of
detection or interception. 1J
Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack
The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the BEACON
HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this time interest in recon
naissance had increased after Dwight D. Eisenhower became
President in January 1953 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with
the quality of the intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities
and the paucity of reconnaissance on the Soviet Bloc. 11
To President Eisenhower and many other US political and mili
tary leaders, the Soviet Union was a dangerous opponent that ap
peared to be moving inexorably toward a position of military parity
with the United States. Particularly alarming was Soviet progress in
the area of nuclear weapons. In the late summer of 1949, the Soviet
Union had detonated an atomic bomb nearly three years sooner than
US ex.perts had predicted. Then in August 1953-a scant nine months
after the first US test of a hydrogen bomb-the Soviet Union deto
nated a hydrogen bomb manufactured from lithium deuteride, a tech
nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US
'' BEACON Hill Report, pp. 164, 167-168 (C). This section of the report was written by
Allen Donovan and Louis Ridenour.
'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.