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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 225 …By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course of events…
  • p. 251 …Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de velop a high…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986. ---. The Soviet…
306
Secret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
During the next six weeks, there were alerts for 15 BLACK
SHIELD missions, seven of which were actually flown. Only four de
tected hostile radar signals. By mid-July 1967, the BLACK SHIELD
missions had provided sufficient evidence for analysts to conclude
that no surface-to-surface missiles had been deployed in North
Vietnam.61
Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all
operational BLACK SHIELD missions. To ensure secure communica
tions between Headauarters and KadenaJ
I
A typical mission over North Vietnam required refueling south
of Okinawa, shortly after takeoff. After the planned photographic pas
ses, the aircraft withdrew for a second aerial refueling in the Thailand
area before returning to Kadena. So great was the plane's speed that it
spent only 12.5 minutes over Vietnam during a "single-pass" mis
sion, and 21.5 minutes during a "two-pass" mission. Because of its
wide 86-mile turning radius, the plane occasionally crossed into
Chinese airspace when getting into position for a second pass.
After the aircraft landed, the camera film was removed and sent
by special plane to processing facilities in the United States. By late
summer, however, an Air Force photo laboratory in Japan began do
ing the processing in order to place the photointelligence in the hands
of US commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours of a mission's com
pletion.
BLACK SHIELD activity continued unabated during the second
half of 1967. From 16 August to 31 December 1967, 26 missions
were alerted and 15 were flown. On I 7 September one SAM site
tracked the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful
with its FAN SONG guidance radar. It was not until 28 October that a
North Vietnamese SAM site launched a missile at the OXCART.
Mission photography documented the event with photographs of mis
sile smoke above the SAM firing site and pictures of the missile and
its contrail. Electronic countermeasures equipment aboard the
OXCART performed well, and the missile did not endanger the air
craft.
•• Minnich. '"OXCART Story:· pp. 25-28 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 119-124, ann.:x
152 (TS Cod.:word ).
ieeret

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.