Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 22 …11 Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- •ify" the B-57 and…
  • p. 54 …the DCI Jfor Planning and Coordination I Headquarters CIA USAF -125 I I I Foreign…
  • p. 55 …total of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test ing faci lity. and three…
  • p. 56 …until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in March 1962. The final…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …later and promptly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call reached…
  • p. 153 …project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not a satisfactory location for overflights of…
  • p. 168 …110 In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came to project headquarters for an…
  • p. 191 …commander at Adana, co Air Force Europe headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward. Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 235 …the pilot reported the incident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately con tacted the Pennsylvania…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with J75 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …been deployed in North Vietnam.61 Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on lO January I 967 that the A- l…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con firmed this decision on 21 May."9 - - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
306
Secret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
During the next six weeks, there were alerts for 15 BLACK
SHIELD missions, seven of which were actually flown. Only four de
tected hostile radar signals. By mid-July 1967, the BLACK SHIELD
missions had provided sufficient evidence for analysts to conclude
that no surface-to-surface missiles had been deployed in North
Vietnam.61
Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all
operational BLACK SHIELD missions. To ensure secure communica
tions between Headauarters and KadenaJ
I
A typical mission over North Vietnam required refueling south
of Okinawa, shortly after takeoff. After the planned photographic pas
ses, the aircraft withdrew for a second aerial refueling in the Thailand
area before returning to Kadena. So great was the plane's speed that it
spent only 12.5 minutes over Vietnam during a "single-pass" mis
sion, and 21.5 minutes during a "two-pass" mission. Because of its
wide 86-mile turning radius, the plane occasionally crossed into
Chinese airspace when getting into position for a second pass.
After the aircraft landed, the camera film was removed and sent
by special plane to processing facilities in the United States. By late
summer, however, an Air Force photo laboratory in Japan began do
ing the processing in order to place the photointelligence in the hands
of US commanders in Vietnam within 24 hours of a mission's com
pletion.
BLACK SHIELD activity continued unabated during the second
half of 1967. From 16 August to 31 December 1967, 26 missions
were alerted and 15 were flown. On I 7 September one SAM site
tracked the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful
with its FAN SONG guidance radar. It was not until 28 October that a
North Vietnamese SAM site launched a missile at the OXCART.
Mission photography documented the event with photographs of mis
sile smoke above the SAM firing site and pictures of the missile and
its contrail. Electronic countermeasures equipment aboard the
OXCART performed well, and the missile did not endanger the air
craft.
•• Minnich. '"OXCART Story:· pp. 25-28 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 119-124, ann.:x
152 (TS Cod.:word ).
ieeret

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.