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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
305
raised the issue at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch .. on 16 ~lay.
Helms got the President's approval, and the CIA put the BLACK
SHIELD plan to deploy the OXCART to the Far East into effect later
that same day.''0
The airlift of personnel and equipment to Kadena began on 17
May 1967, and on 22 May the first A-12 flew nonstop from Area 51
to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. A second aircraft arrived on
24 May. The third A-12 left on 26 May, but the pilot had trouble with
the inertial navigation system and communications near Wake Island.
He made a precautionary landing at Wake. where a pre-positioned
emergency recovery team was located. The problem was corrected
and the aircraft continued its flight to Kadena on the following day.
Before the start of the operation, the CIA briefed a number of
key US and Allied officials on the operation. Included were the US
Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station in the Phillippines. Formosa.
Thailand, South Vietna~ !he High C[:·:·::inner::_an_d_
Chief of Station on Okinawa: the Pnme Ministe 7
Thailand; the President and Defense Minister of t e _epu 1c~
China: and the Air Force chiefs of Thailand and the Republic of
China. All of these officials favored the operation.
By 29 May 1967, 13 days after President Johnson's approval,
BLACK SHIELD was ready to fly an operational mission. On 30
May, the detachment was alerted for a mission on the following day.
As the takeoff time approached, Kadena was being deluged by rain.
but, since weather over the target area was clear, flight preparations
continued. The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain,
taxied to the runway and took off.
This first BLACK SHIELD mission flew one flight path over
North Vietnam and another over the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The
mission was flown at Mach 3.1 and 80.000 feet and lasted three hours
and 39 minutes. While over North Vietnam. the A-12 photographed
70 of the 190 known surface-to-air missile sites and nine other prior
ity targets. The A- I2's ECM equipment did not detect any radar sig
nals during the mission, which indicated that the flight had gone
completely unnoticed by both the Chinese and North Vietnamese.
"Minnich. "OXCART Story." p. 25 (Sl.
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 6
~eeret

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.