Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 22 …11 Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- •ify" the B-57 and…
  • p. 54 …the DCI Jfor Planning and Coordination I Headquarters CIA USAF -125 I I I Foreign…
  • p. 55 …total of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test ing faci lity. and three…
  • p. 56 …until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in March 1962. The final…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …later and promptly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call reached…
  • p. 153 …project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not a satisfactory location for overflights of…
  • p. 168 …110 In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came to project headquarters for an…
  • p. 191 …commander at Adana, co Air Force Europe headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward. Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 235 …the pilot reported the incident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately con tacted the Pennsylvania…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with J75 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …been deployed in North Vietnam.61 Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on lO January I 967 that the A- l…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con firmed this decision on 21 May."9 - - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
305
raised the issue at President Johnson's "Tuesday lunch .. on 16 ~lay.
Helms got the President's approval, and the CIA put the BLACK
SHIELD plan to deploy the OXCART to the Far East into effect later
that same day.''0
The airlift of personnel and equipment to Kadena began on 17
May 1967, and on 22 May the first A-12 flew nonstop from Area 51
to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. A second aircraft arrived on
24 May. The third A-12 left on 26 May, but the pilot had trouble with
the inertial navigation system and communications near Wake Island.
He made a precautionary landing at Wake. where a pre-positioned
emergency recovery team was located. The problem was corrected
and the aircraft continued its flight to Kadena on the following day.
Before the start of the operation, the CIA briefed a number of
key US and Allied officials on the operation. Included were the US
Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station in the Phillippines. Formosa.
Thailand, South Vietna~ !he High C[:·:·::inner::_an_d_
Chief of Station on Okinawa: the Pnme Ministe 7
Thailand; the President and Defense Minister of t e _epu 1c~
China: and the Air Force chiefs of Thailand and the Republic of
China. All of these officials favored the operation.
By 29 May 1967, 13 days after President Johnson's approval,
BLACK SHIELD was ready to fly an operational mission. On 30
May, the detachment was alerted for a mission on the following day.
As the takeoff time approached, Kadena was being deluged by rain.
but, since weather over the target area was clear, flight preparations
continued. The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain,
taxied to the runway and took off.
This first BLACK SHIELD mission flew one flight path over
North Vietnam and another over the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The
mission was flown at Mach 3.1 and 80.000 feet and lasted three hours
and 39 minutes. While over North Vietnam. the A-12 photographed
70 of the 190 known surface-to-air missile sites and nine other prior
ity targets. The A- I2's ECM equipment did not detect any radar sig
nals during the mission, which indicated that the flight had gone
completely unnoticed by both the Chinese and North Vietnamese.
"Minnich. "OXCART Story." p. 25 (Sl.
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 6
~eeret

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About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.