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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 12 later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the…
  • p. 40 …and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish ments. After receiving…
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …in the United Kingdom. At about the ' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword). ' Press Release of…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47. '' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). ~eeret
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 174 …Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in…
  • p. 183 …On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze Sencae Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …Smithsonian Institute Press, l 985. Khrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown…
  • p. 401 …United Kingdom (See Great Britain) United Kingdom Requirements Committee 154 United Nations 20 United Press International…
304
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Chapter 6
hoped that the A- 12's passage would provoke Soviet air defense per
sonnel to activate the Tallinn system radars in order to track the swift
OXCART aircraft. As the A-12 made its dash down the Baltic, its
Type-I camera would be filming the entire south coast. If Agency an
alysts were correct in their assumption that the Tallinn system was de
signed to counter high-altitude aircraft at long ranges, then the
OXCART would be in jeopardy during this dash down the Baltic.
Nevertheless, Agency weapons experts believed that the A-12 air
craft's speed and suite of electronic countermeasures would keep it
safe from the standard Soviet surface-to-air missile installations.
While the A-12 was conducting its high-speed dash along the
Baltic coast of Eastern Europe, the U-2 would be flying farther out to
sea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs. The U-2 would be
able to collect the Tallinn radar installation's ELINT emanations.
Agency and Defense Department officials supported the pro
posed mission, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly opposed it
and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President
Johnson. 5" The Tallinn radar installation remained of great interest to
the intelligence community, and in the late 1960s the CIA attempted
to develop a small, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that could pho
tograph Tallinn and other coastal areas. The project (AQUILINE) was
abandoned in 1971 (see appendix E).
FIRST A-12 DEPLOYMENT: OPERATION BLACK SHIELD
Although the Tallinn mission was still being considered in May 1967,
another possible employment for the OXCART came under discus
sion. This time the proposal was for OXCART to collect tactical
rather than strategic intelligence. The cause was apprehension in
Washington about the possible undetected introduction of sur
face-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam. When President Johnson
asked for a proposal on the matter, the CIA suggested that the
OXCART be used. While the State and Defense Departments were
still examining the proposal's political risks, DCI Richard Helms
"Memorandum for DOC! R. L. Taylor from C. E. Duckett. DDS&T...Collection of Photo
and ELINT Data on Tallinn Sites Utilizing the OXCART and the U-2... 4 May 1967.
DS&T records (TS Codeword).
Sec, el

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.