Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 225 …By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course of events…
  • p. 251 …Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de velop a high…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986. ---. The Soviet…
304
~eerct PJOHHU~
Chapter 6
hoped that the A- 12's passage would provoke Soviet air defense per
sonnel to activate the Tallinn system radars in order to track the swift
OXCART aircraft. As the A-12 made its dash down the Baltic, its
Type-I camera would be filming the entire south coast. If Agency an
alysts were correct in their assumption that the Tallinn system was de
signed to counter high-altitude aircraft at long ranges, then the
OXCART would be in jeopardy during this dash down the Baltic.
Nevertheless, Agency weapons experts believed that the A-12 air
craft's speed and suite of electronic countermeasures would keep it
safe from the standard Soviet surface-to-air missile installations.
While the A-12 was conducting its high-speed dash along the
Baltic coast of Eastern Europe, the U-2 would be flying farther out to
sea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs. The U-2 would be
able to collect the Tallinn radar installation's ELINT emanations.
Agency and Defense Department officials supported the pro
posed mission, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly opposed it
and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President
Johnson. 5" The Tallinn radar installation remained of great interest to
the intelligence community, and in the late 1960s the CIA attempted
to develop a small, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that could pho
tograph Tallinn and other coastal areas. The project (AQUILINE) was
abandoned in 1971 (see appendix E).
FIRST A-12 DEPLOYMENT: OPERATION BLACK SHIELD
Although the Tallinn mission was still being considered in May 1967,
another possible employment for the OXCART came under discus
sion. This time the proposal was for OXCART to collect tactical
rather than strategic intelligence. The cause was apprehension in
Washington about the possible undetected introduction of sur
face-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam. When President Johnson
asked for a proposal on the matter, the CIA suggested that the
OXCART be used. While the State and Defense Departments were
still examining the proposal's political risks, DCI Richard Helms
"Memorandum for DOC! R. L. Taylor from C. E. Duckett. DDS&T...Collection of Photo
and ELINT Data on Tallinn Sites Utilizing the OXCART and the U-2... 4 May 1967.
DS&T records (TS Codeword).
Sec, el

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.