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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
303
Soviet missile system. As early as 1962, the intelligence community
began to be concerned about the actual purpose of new missile instal
lations that first appeared near Tallinn, Estonia, and soon spread along
the northwestern quadrant of the Soviet Union. Attempts to photo
graph the sites using reconnaissance satellites had been frustrated by
the prevailing cloud cover in the region. Because of the lack of accu
rate information about the missile sites, there was a wide divergence
of views within the intelligence community about their purpose.
These views ranged from the CIA's belief that the installations con
tained long-range, surface-to-air missiles designed to counter strate
gic bombers, to the Air Force's contention that Tallinn sites
represented a deployed antiballistic missile system.
Photointerpreters insisted that imagery with a resolution of 12 to
18 inches was necessary to determine missile size, antenna pattern,
and configuration of the engagement radars associated with the sys
tem. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) analysts also needed data about
the Tallinn radars, but there were no collection sites that could moni
tor the Tallinn emanations when the radars were being tested.
Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and
lockon modes, a fact that prevented analysts from knowing the fre
quencies or any other performance characteristics of the radar.
To settle the question of the purpose of the Tallinn installations.
Office of Special Activities planners proposed a mission that would
use the high resolution of the OXCART's camera along with the
U-2's sophisticated ELINT-collection equipment. This project's un
classified name was Project SCOPE LOGIC; its classified title was
Operation UPWIND.
The proposed project involved launching an A-12 OXCART air
craft from Area 51 in Nevada and flying it to a Baltic Sea rendezvous
with a Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great
Britain. The OXCART would fly north of Norway and then turn south
along the Soviet-Finnish border. Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12
would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the coasts of
Estonia, Latvia. Lithuania, Poland. and East Germany before heading
west to return to Area 51. The entire flight would cover 11,000 nauti
cal miles, take eight hours and 38 minutes, and require four aerial re
fuelings.
Although the A-12 would not violate Soviet airspace during this
dash, it would appear to Soviet radar network operators to be headed
for an overflight penetration in the vicinity of Leningrad. It was
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.