Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
303
Soviet missile system. As early as 1962, the intelligence community
began to be concerned about the actual purpose of new missile instal
lations that first appeared near Tallinn, Estonia, and soon spread along
the northwestern quadrant of the Soviet Union. Attempts to photo
graph the sites using reconnaissance satellites had been frustrated by
the prevailing cloud cover in the region. Because of the lack of accu
rate information about the missile sites, there was a wide divergence
of views within the intelligence community about their purpose.
These views ranged from the CIA's belief that the installations con
tained long-range, surface-to-air missiles designed to counter strate
gic bombers, to the Air Force's contention that Tallinn sites
represented a deployed antiballistic missile system.
Photointerpreters insisted that imagery with a resolution of 12 to
18 inches was necessary to determine missile size, antenna pattern,
and configuration of the engagement radars associated with the sys
tem. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) analysts also needed data about
the Tallinn radars, but there were no collection sites that could moni
tor the Tallinn emanations when the radars were being tested.
Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and
lockon modes, a fact that prevented analysts from knowing the fre
quencies or any other performance characteristics of the radar.
To settle the question of the purpose of the Tallinn installations.
Office of Special Activities planners proposed a mission that would
use the high resolution of the OXCART's camera along with the
U-2's sophisticated ELINT-collection equipment. This project's un
classified name was Project SCOPE LOGIC; its classified title was
Operation UPWIND.
The proposed project involved launching an A-12 OXCART air
craft from Area 51 in Nevada and flying it to a Baltic Sea rendezvous
with a Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great
Britain. The OXCART would fly north of Norway and then turn south
along the Soviet-Finnish border. Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12
would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the coasts of
Estonia, Latvia. Lithuania, Poland. and East Germany before heading
west to return to Area 51. The entire flight would cover 11,000 nauti
cal miles, take eight hours and 38 minutes, and require four aerial re
fuelings.
Although the A-12 would not violate Soviet airspace during this
dash, it would appear to Soviet radar network operators to be headed
for an overflight penetration in the vicinity of Leningrad. It was
6ee1 et NOFOFUil
Chapter 6
&eeret

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.