Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
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300 Seeret NOFORN Chapter 6 demonstrated its ability to conduct overflights of Cuba by the 5 November deadline, which passed without any hostile action by the Soviets or Cubans. The detachment then worked to develop the capa bility for sustained operations with its five aircraft. All these preparations were valuable training for the OXCART program, even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to satisfy collection requirements for Cuba, the A- l 2s were reserved for more critical situations. When the Agency declared that OXCART had achieved emer gency operational status on 5 November 196-+. the aircraft was still not prepared for electronic warfare, as only one of the several planned electronic countermeasure devices had been installed. Nevertheless. a senior government panel decided that the OXCART could conduct initial overflights of Cuba without a full complement of warning and jamming devices, should the need for such missions arise. One reason for the delay in completing OXCART's electronic warfare preparations was the Air Force's concern that OXCART use of existing ECM devices c_ould, in the event of the loss of an OXCART over hostile territory, compromise the ECM equipment used by Air Force bombers and fighters. Even if OXCART's ECM devices were merely similar to military ECM systems, the Air Force still worried that their use would give the Soviets an opportunity to work out countermeasures. Such concerns led the Agency to an entirely different approach to antiradar efforts in Project KEMPSTER. This project attempted to develop electron guns that could be mounted on the OXCART to gen erate an ion cloud in front of the plane that would reduce its radar cross section. Although this project proved unsuccessful, the CIA also developed a number of more conventional ECM devices for use in the OXCART.53 As the OXCART's performance and equipment continued to im prove, there was renewed consideration of deploying the aircraft overseas, particularly in Asia, where US military activity was increas ing. On 18 March 1965, DCI McCone, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance discussed the " OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 1-49-151 (TS Codeword): Notes on the OXCART project by John Parangosky. OSA records (TS Codeword). Seer:at
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.