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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 5 …139 Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142 Declining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143 Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U…
  • p. 7 …320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the…
  • p. 91 …Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation…
  • p. 95 …their awareness of the vital nature of their mission kept the level of cooperation high. The…
  • p. 143 …deception project since its early days, he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that made…
  • p. 155 …the beginning of cooperation between CIA and the Norwegian Intelligence Service on the U-2 program…
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 169 …a logical ex tension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two countries on…
  • p. 196 …as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap tors. To extract the maximum…
  • p. 287 …by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small…
  • p. 302 …Halaby cooperated fully with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to…
  • p. 334 …The cooperation between the Agency and the Air Force that began with the U-2 and…
299
Although overflights of the Soviet Union appeared to be out of
the question, the OXCART's eventual employment elsewhere in the
world remained a strong possibility, particularly after the Cuban
Missile Crisis of October 1962 demonstrated the continuing need for
manned strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Since satellites had not been
able to supply the kinds of coverage needed, U-2s had carried out nu
merous overflights of Cuba. Nevertheless, the U-2 remained vulnera
ble to surface-to-air missiles (as had once again been demonstrated by
the downing of a SAC U-2 during the Missile Crisis), and project
headquarters had even briefly considered sending the A-12 over Cuba
in October 1962, even though the aircraft still lacked the required 158
engines and would have had to use much less powerful ones.'' After
the Missile Crisis ended, Air Force U-2s continued to photograph
Cuba under a tacit superpower understanding that such monitoring of
the withdrawal of the missiles would proceed without interference.
But the possibility of future Soviet or Cuban action against the U-2s
remained, raising the dismaying prospect that the United States would
not be able to tell if the Soviet Union was reintroducing ballistic mis
siles into Cuba.
Such fears became acute in the summer of 1964 after Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev told foreign visitors such as columnist
Drew Pearson, former Senator William Benton, and Danish Prime
Minister Jens Otto Krag that, once the US elections had been held in
November, U-2s flying over Cuba would be shot down. Project head
quarters therefore began preparing contingency plans (Project
SKYLARK) for the possible employment of OXCART over Cuba,
even though the new aircraft was not yet ready for operations. On 5
August 1964, the Acting DCI, Gen. Marshall S. Carter, ordered the
project staff to achieve emergency operational readiness of the
OXCART by 5 November 1964, in case Premier Khrushchev actually
carried out his threat to shoot down U-2s. 5z
To meet this deadline, the Office of Special Activities organized
a detachment of five pilots and ground crews to conduct flights to val
idate camera performance and qualify pilots for Mach 2.8 operations.
Simulating Cuban missions during training flights, the detachment
"On 23 October 1962 Johnson noted in his "Archangel log": that the performance of an
A-12 with J75 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for possible use over Cuba)
would be "hardly spectacular."
'' Johnson, .. Archangel log,.. 17 August 1964; Minnich, "OXCART Story, .. p. 19 (S );
OSA History, chap. 20. p. 81 (TS Codeword).
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 6
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.