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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
297
~eeret NOFOPU''l
Chapter 6
decided to go to Nevada and take charge of the OXCART's develop
ment himself. His presence made a big difference, as can be seen in
his notes in the project log:
I uncovered many items of a managerial, materiel and design na-
ture.... I had meetings with vendors to improve their opera-
tion.... Changed supervision and had daily talks with them,
going over in detail all problems on the aircraft .... Increased the
supervision in the electrical group by 500% .... We tightened up
the inspection procedures a great deal and made inspection stick.
It appears that the problems are one-third due to bum engineer
ing.... The addition of so many systems to the A-12 has greatly
complicated the problems, but we did solve the overall problem."''
These improvements in on-site management got the project back on
schedule.
By 20 November 1965, the final validation flights for OXCART
deployment were finished. During these tests. the OXCART achieved
a maximum speed of Mach 3.29. an altitude of 90,000 feet. and sus
tained flight time above Mach 3.2 of 74 minutes. The maximum
- errdurance test lasted six hours and 20 minutes. On 22 November.
Kelly Johnson wrote to Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford. head of the
Office of Special Activities, stating. "'The time has come when the
bird should leave its nest. .. ""
Three years and seven months after its first flight in April 1962.
the OXCART was ready for operational use. It was now time to find
work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built.
DISCUSSIONS ON THE OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
Although the OXCART had been designed to replace the U-2 as a
strategic reconnaissance aircraft to fly over the Soviet Union, this use
had become doubtful long before the OXCART was ready for
operational use. The U-2 Affair of 1960 made Presidents very reluc
tant to consider overflights of the Soviet Union. Indeed. Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy had both stated publicly that the United
States would not conduct such overflights. In July 1962. Secretary of
"Johnson, .. Archangel log," 5 August-30 April 1965.
''' Minnich, "'OXCART Story... p. 23 (S).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.