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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
18
Secret ~OfiORN
Chapter 1
Sec1et
defense known as Project LINCOLN, then under way at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By the end of the year, these
experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their head
quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which
soon became the codename for the reconnaissance project. The con
sultants were called the BEACON HILL Study Group.
The study group's chairman was Kodak physicist Carl F. P.
Overhage, and its members included James G. Baker and Edward M.
Purcell from Harvard; Saville Davis from the Christian Science
Monitor; Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical
Laboratory; Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia Broadcasting System
Laboratories; Edwin H. Land, founder of the Polaroid Corporation;
Stewart E. Miller of Bell Laboratories; Richard S. Perkin of the
Perkin-Elmer Company; and Louis N. Ridenour of Ridenour
Associates, Inc. The Wright Air Development Command sent Lt. Col.
Richard Leghorn to serve as its liaison officer.30
During January and February 1952, the BEACON HILL Study
Group traveled every weekend to various airbases, laboratories, and
firms for briefings on the latest technology and projects. The panel
members were particularly interested in new approaches to aerial re
connaissance, such as photography from high-flying aircraft and
camera-carrying balloons. One of the more unusual (albeit unsuccess
ful) proposals examined by the panel was an "invisible" dirigible.
This was to be a giant, almost flat-shaped airship with a blue-tinted,
nonreflective coating; it would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet
along the borders of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using
a large lens to photograph targets of interest.31
After completing these briefings at the end of February 1952, the
BEACON HILL Study Group returned to MIT, where the panel mem
bers spent the next three months writing a report detailing their
recommendations for ways to improve the amount and quality of in
telligence being gathered on the Soviet Bloc. Published as a classified
"' USAF, Project LINCOLN. BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence
and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 15 June 1952, pp. v, xi: app.
A (S. downgraded to C).
'' Allen F. Donovan. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach. 21 June 1985
(U) : James G. Baker, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording, Washington,
DC, 24 April 1985 (S}.

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.