Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Headquarters”22 pages
So&Fet NOFORN
Chapter 6
296
Two more A- l 2s were lost in later testing. On 9 July 1964, arti
cle 133 crashed while landing when a pitch-control servo device
froze, rolling the plane into a wing-down position. Ejecting from an
altitude of 120 feet, the pilot was blown sideways out of the craft.
Although he was not very high off the ground, his parachute did open
and he landed during the parachute's first swing. Fortunately he was
unhurt, and no news of the accident filtered out of the base. Eighteen
months later, on 28 December 1965, article 126 crashed immediately
after takeoff because of an improperly wired stability augmentation
system. As in the previous crash, the pilot ejected safely. and there
was no publicity connected with the crash. An investigation ordered
by DCI McCone determined that the wiring error had resulted from
negligence, not sabotage.'6
The A-12 made its first long-range, high-speed flight on 27
January 1965. The flight lasted I 00 minutes. 75 minutes of which
were flown at speeds greater than Mach 3.1. and the aircraft covered
2.580 miles at altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet. By this time.
the OXCART was performing well. The engine inlet, camera, hydrau
lic, navigation, and flight-control systems all demonstrated acceptable
reliability.
Nevertheless, as the OXCART began flying longer, faster, and
higher, new problems arose. The most serious of these problems in
volved the aircraft's wiring. Continuing malfunctions of the inlet con
trols, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit
instruments were often attributable to wiring failures. Wiring connec
tors and components had to withstand temperatures above 800'F,
structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Such demands were more
than the materials could stand. Not all of the OXCART's problems
could be traced to materiel failures, however, and Agency officials
believed that careless maintenance by Lockheed employees also con
tributed to malfunctions."
Concerned that Lockheed would not be able to meet the
OXCART's schedule for operational readiness, the Office of Special
Activities' Director of Technology, John Parangosky, met with Kelly
Johnson on 3 August 1965 to discuss the project's problems. Johnson
not only assigned more top-level supervisors to the project but also
'" Ibid.. pp. 80-81 {TS Codeword): Minnich. ··OXCART Story,"' pp. 17-18 tS).
"OSA History. chap. 20. p. 9-4 (TS Codr:word).
Seeret Not linked to a story yet.
Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.