Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 12 later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the…
  • p. 40 …and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish ments. After receiving…
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …in the United Kingdom. At about the ' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword). ' Press Release of…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47. '' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). ~eeret
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 174 …Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in…
  • p. 183 …On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze Sencae Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …Smithsonian Institute Press, l 985. Khrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown…
  • p. 401 …United Kingdom (See Great Britain) United Kingdom Requirements Committee 154 United Nations 20 United Press International…
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Secret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
yet needed. Agreeing with McCone's position, President Johnson said
the issue should be reviewed again in February."'
One additional argument in favor of surfacing the OXCART was
the realization that the aircraft could not be used to fly undetected
over the Soviet Union. By 1962 the United States had become aware
of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar system, codenamed TALL
KING. The introduction of this computer-controlled radar undercut
one of the basic premises of the OXCART program, the assumption
that radar operators would not be able to track high-flying supersonic
targets visually because of their small, nonpersistent radar returns. By
coupling a computer to a radar, the Soviets could now weight the in
dividual radar returns and identify those produced by high-flying,
very fast objects.·'
By February 1964 DCI McCone had become convinced that sur
facing was necessary. Soviet development of the TALL KING radar
system had eliminated his hope that OXCART would eventually be
able to carry out its original intended purpose-overflights of the
USSR. The final decision on the issue of surfacing the OXCART
came at a National Security Council meeting on 29 February 1964, at
which all of the participants supported the decision to surface. That
same day President Johnson held a news conference at which he an
nounced the successful development of an .. advanced experimental
jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more
than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet.".~
President Johnson had spoken of the A- I I rather than the
Agency's A-12, and the aircraft that was actually revealed to the pub
lic was the Air Force's YF- l 2A interceptor. a project that had already
been canceled. ➔' Following the President's announcement. two of
"'John A. McCone. "Memorandum for the Record. Meeting with the President. Secretary
McNamara. Mr. Bundy and DC!." 29 November 1963. DCI records (TS); OSA History.
chap. 20. p. 73 (TS Codeword).
"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. I-n-149 (TS Codeword).
'' John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record. "Discussion at the NSC Meeting.
Attended by the President. all members and the four members of the President's personal
staff. 29 February 1964," 2 March 1964. DC! records (S); Minnich, "OXCART Story," p.
14-erroneously identifies the date as 24 February-(S).
" President Johnson ·s use of the designator A-11 at the press conference has sometimes
been called an error, but Kelly Johnson wrote the President's press release and chose this
designator for security reasons because it referred to the earlier version of the aircraft that
lacked the radar-defeating modifi1.:ations of the A-12. Johnson, "Archangel log," 25
February 1964.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.