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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 6 …255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257 0 ) Chapter 6 The U-2…
  • p. 7 …319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 11 / Chapter 1 gravity (g's) instead of the military specification strengLh of 5.33 g…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US '' BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …seen on pilot Francis Gary Powers) advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num ber of…
  • p. 183 …if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 206 …In 1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special Activities. The Office…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 249 …The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave…
  • p. 250 …Chapter 5 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued…
  • p. 252 …In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM • 60 equipment. •• Mission…
  • p. 265 …but some was the result of technological advances. The ini tial order for eight of the…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588 program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 296 …Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and…
  • p. 307 …advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft-the OXCART-and…
  • p. 352 …They believed that recent advances in the minia turization of electronic technology would make possible the…
  • p. 356 343 Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and provided DOD funding for ORD…
294
Secret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
yet needed. Agreeing with McCone's position, President Johnson said
the issue should be reviewed again in February."'
One additional argument in favor of surfacing the OXCART was
the realization that the aircraft could not be used to fly undetected
over the Soviet Union. By 1962 the United States had become aware
of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar system, codenamed TALL
KING. The introduction of this computer-controlled radar undercut
one of the basic premises of the OXCART program, the assumption
that radar operators would not be able to track high-flying supersonic
targets visually because of their small, nonpersistent radar returns. By
coupling a computer to a radar, the Soviets could now weight the in
dividual radar returns and identify those produced by high-flying,
very fast objects.·'
By February 1964 DCI McCone had become convinced that sur
facing was necessary. Soviet development of the TALL KING radar
system had eliminated his hope that OXCART would eventually be
able to carry out its original intended purpose-overflights of the
USSR. The final decision on the issue of surfacing the OXCART
came at a National Security Council meeting on 29 February 1964, at
which all of the participants supported the decision to surface. That
same day President Johnson held a news conference at which he an
nounced the successful development of an .. advanced experimental
jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more
than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet.".~
President Johnson had spoken of the A- I I rather than the
Agency's A-12, and the aircraft that was actually revealed to the pub
lic was the Air Force's YF- l 2A interceptor. a project that had already
been canceled. ➔' Following the President's announcement. two of
"'John A. McCone. "Memorandum for the Record. Meeting with the President. Secretary
McNamara. Mr. Bundy and DC!." 29 November 1963. DCI records (TS); OSA History.
chap. 20. p. 73 (TS Codeword).
"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. I-n-149 (TS Codeword).
'' John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record. "Discussion at the NSC Meeting.
Attended by the President. all members and the four members of the President's personal
staff. 29 February 1964," 2 March 1964. DC! records (S); Minnich, "OXCART Story," p.
14-erroneously identifies the date as 24 February-(S).
" President Johnson ·s use of the designator A-11 at the press conference has sometimes
been called an error, but Kelly Johnson wrote the President's press release and chose this
designator for security reasons because it referred to the earlier version of the aircraft that
lacked the radar-defeating modifi1.:ations of the A-12. Johnson, "Archangel log," 25
February 1964.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.