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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 12 later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the…
  • p. 40 …and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish ments. After receiving…
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …in the United Kingdom. At about the ' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword). ' Press Release of…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47. '' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). ~eeret
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 174 …Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in…
  • p. 183 …On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze Sencae Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …Smithsonian Institute Press, l 985. Khrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown…
  • p. 401 …United Kingdom (See Great Britain) United Kingdom Requirements Committee 154 United Nations 20 United Press International…
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6ee1 et NOFOAN
Chapter 6
First flight of the A-12,
30 April 1962
Initial testing could not explore the A-12·s maximum potential,
since the J58 engine was stil l not ready. Developing this power plant
to OXCART specifications was proving much more difficult than
had been expected because the J58 had to reach performance levels
never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating under ex
tremely difficult environmental conditions. To simulate the stress
that the J58 would undergo during maximum power output (Mach
3.2 at 97,000 feet), the power plant was tested in the exhaust stream
of a 175 engine. ln the course of this extremely severe testing, the
J58•s problems were gradually overcome. By January 1963, Pratt &
Whitney had delivered 10 J58 engines to the Nevada testi ng site.
T he first flight of an A- 12 with two J58 eng ines took place on
15 January 1963. μ
SPEED-RELATED PROBLEMS
As 158-equipped A-12s reached higher and higher speeds. more diffi
culties arose. Major problems developed at speeds between Mach 2.4
and 2.8 because the aircraft's shock wave interfered with the flow of
air into the engine. greatly reducing its performance. Solving this
problem required long and often highly frustrating experimentation
•· William H. Brown. ··J58/SR-7 I Propulsion lntt!gration." Studies i11 /ntellis:,·11c,e 26
(Summt!r 1981):pp. 17-18 ( U): OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 5~. 67 (TS Co<lc:wor<l).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.