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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
289
ieeret NOFORN
Chapter 6
fillets, which had been secured to the airframe with epoxy resin. had
to be recovered and reaffixed to the aircraft, a process that took the
next four days.
Once the fillets were in place, the OXCART'S official first flight
t0ok place on 30 April 1962, witnessed by a number of Agency per
sonnel including DOR Scoville. Richard Bissell was also present, and
Kelly Johnson noted in the project log, ·•1 was very happy to have
Dick see this flight, with all that he has contributed to the pro
gram ... ·'' This official first flight was also the first flight with the
wheels up. Piloted again by Schalk, the OXCART took off at 170
knots and climbed to 30.000 feet. During the 59-minute flight, the
A-I2 achieved a top speed of 340 knots. Kelly Johnson declared it to
be the smoothest first test flight of any aircraft he had designed or
tested. On 2 May 1962, during the second test flight, the OXCART
broke the sound barrier, achieving a speed of Mach l.1.)1
Four more aircraft. including a two-seat trainer, arrived at the
testing site before the end of the year. During the second delive,y on John Parangosky
. 2~.June 1962. the extra-wide vehicle carrying the aircraft acciderntally
struck a Greyhound bus traveling in the opposite direction. Pr-oject
managers quickly authorized payment of $4,890 for the damage done
to the bus in order to avoid having to explain in court why the
OXCART deli very vehicle was so wide.
One of the biggest problems connected with flight testing the
A-I2 was keeping its existence secret. Realizing that the nation's air
traffic controllers would be among the first unwitting people to llearn
about the plane, the Deputy Assistant Director for Special Activities,
James Cunningham, had called on Federal Aviation Administrator
Najeeb E. Halaby in early 1962 to brief him about the craft's existence
and ask his assistance in keeping it secret. Halaby cooperated fully
with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how
to handle reports of unusually fast, high-tlying aircraft. Air contrcillers
were warned not to mention the craft on the radio but to submit written
reports of sightings or radar truckings. The Air Force gave similar
briefings to NORAD, the North American Air Defense Command:''
'' Johnson. •• Archangel log:· 30 Apri l 1962.
' ' OSA History. chap. 20. p. 63 (TS CoJewor<l); Minnich. "OXCART Story:· pp. 11-12 (S).
"Minnich. ··OXCART Story:· pp. 10-11 (S): OSA Hiswry. chap. 20. p. 60 (TS Co<lcworJ).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.