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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
iac;ret l)IQFORL'I
Chapter 1
17
Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit
well into Allen Dulles·s perception of the proper role of an intelli
gence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage,
which relied on agents rather than technology. 1s
At this point, the summer of 1954, L ockheed's CL-282 proposal
still lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers
among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key
decisionmakers at both· Air Force and CI A remained unconvinced. To
make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional
source of support was necessary: prominent scientists serving on gov
ernment advisory boards.
SCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had
played a major role in advising the government on technical matters
during World War II. At the end of the war, most of the scientific ad-
visory boards were disbanded, but within a few years the growing
te_n_sions of the Cold War again led governmen t agencies to seek sci-
entific advice and assistance. In 1947 the Air Force established a
Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of
current interest and advise the Air Force on the potential usefulne:ss of
new technologies. The following year the Office of Defense
Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, bU1t the
Truman administration made little use of this new advisory body.=-•
DC/ Allen W. Dulles
The BEACON HILL Report
In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists be
cause the Strategic Air Command's requests for information about
targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be fl tied. To look for new
ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air
Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Maj. Gen. Gordon P.
Saville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on air
" Powers. Man Who Kept rhe Secrets. pp. 103-104: Edwin H. Land. interview by Donald
E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Cambridge. Massachusetts. 17 and '.!0 Septembc:r 198.t
(TS Codeword): Robert Amory. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.
Pedlow. Washingt0n. DC. 22 April 1987 (S}.
"' For more informa1ion on the Air Force·s use of sciemisL~ see Thomas A. Sturm. Tit<'
USAF Scienrific Advisorv Board: Its First Twenty Years. /9.J.J. /964 (Washington. DC:
USAF Historical Oftice. 1967) (U).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.