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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
iac;ret l)IQFORL'I
Chapter 1
17
Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit
well into Allen Dulles·s perception of the proper role of an intelli
gence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage,
which relied on agents rather than technology. 1s
At this point, the summer of 1954, L ockheed's CL-282 proposal
still lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers
among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key
decisionmakers at both· Air Force and CI A remained unconvinced. To
make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional
source of support was necessary: prominent scientists serving on gov
ernment advisory boards.
SCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had
played a major role in advising the government on technical matters
during World War II. At the end of the war, most of the scientific ad-
visory boards were disbanded, but within a few years the growing
te_n_sions of the Cold War again led governmen t agencies to seek sci-
entific advice and assistance. In 1947 the Air Force established a
Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of
current interest and advise the Air Force on the potential usefulne:ss of
new technologies. The following year the Office of Defense
Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, bU1t the
Truman administration made little use of this new advisory body.=-•
DC/ Allen W. Dulles
The BEACON HILL Report
In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists be
cause the Strategic Air Command's requests for information about
targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be fl tied. To look for new
ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air
Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Maj. Gen. Gordon P.
Saville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on air
" Powers. Man Who Kept rhe Secrets. pp. 103-104: Edwin H. Land. interview by Donald
E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Cambridge. Massachusetts. 17 and '.!0 Septembc:r 198.t
(TS Codeword): Robert Amory. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.
Pedlow. Washingt0n. DC. 22 April 1987 (S}.
"' For more informa1ion on the Air Force·s use of sciemisL~ see Thomas A. Sturm. Tit<'
USAF Scienrific Advisorv Board: Its First Twenty Years. /9.J.J. /964 (Washington. DC:
USAF Historical Oftice. 1967) (U).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.