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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design." Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …19 On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional source of support was…
  • p. 42 …it. A lthough Land had heard Allen Donovan '' James R. Killian. Jr.. interview by Donald E…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory…
  • p. 69 …staff) flew over Nevada with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Battin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermarnn Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a '·wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 …The committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this meeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
iac;ret l)IQFORL'I
Chapter 1
17
Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not fit
well into Allen Dulles·s perception of the proper role of an intelli
gence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage,
which relied on agents rather than technology. 1s
At this point, the summer of 1954, L ockheed's CL-282 proposal
still lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers
among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key
decisionmakers at both· Air Force and CI A remained unconvinced. To
make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional
source of support was necessary: prominent scientists serving on gov
ernment advisory boards.
SCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had
played a major role in advising the government on technical matters
during World War II. At the end of the war, most of the scientific ad-
visory boards were disbanded, but within a few years the growing
te_n_sions of the Cold War again led governmen t agencies to seek sci-
entific advice and assistance. In 1947 the Air Force established a
Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of
current interest and advise the Air Force on the potential usefulne:ss of
new technologies. The following year the Office of Defense
Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee, bU1t the
Truman administration made little use of this new advisory body.=-•
DC/ Allen W. Dulles
The BEACON HILL Report
In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists be
cause the Strategic Air Command's requests for information about
targets behind the Iron Curtain could not be fl tied. To look for new
ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air
Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, Maj. Gen. Gordon P.
Saville, added 15 reconnaissance experts to an existing project on air
" Powers. Man Who Kept rhe Secrets. pp. 103-104: Edwin H. Land. interview by Donald
E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Cambridge. Massachusetts. 17 and '.!0 Septembc:r 198.t
(TS Codeword): Robert Amory. Jr.. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.
Pedlow. Washingt0n. DC. 22 April 1987 (S}.
"' For more informa1ion on the Air Force·s use of sciemisL~ see Thomas A. Sturm. Tit<'
USAF Scienrific Advisorv Board: Its First Twenty Years. /9.J.J. /964 (Washington. DC:
USAF Historical Oftice. 1967) (U).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.