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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
285
to reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials de
cided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No.
11 to the contract reduced from 12 to IO the number of A- l 2s, for a
total cost of $16 l.2 million. 21
The cancellation of these two A- l 2s was offset by an Air Force
order for the development of a supersonic interceptor variant of the
A-12 to serve as a replacement for the North American F- l08A Rapier
interceptor project, which had been canceled in late 1960. With the
assistance of the Agency's west coast contracting office, the Air Force
entered into an agreement with Lockheed to produce three AF-12 air
craft, based on the A- I 2 design but modified to carry a second crew
man and three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project
KEDLOCK. The AF-12 (later redesignated the YF- l 2A) was de
signed to intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the
United States, and initial Air Force plans envisioned a force of up to
I 00 of these supersonic interceptors. In fact, only three of these planes
were built and delivered during the 1963-64 time frame because
Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled the program as a cost-cut
ting measure. The Air Force bore all of the costs of the YF-12A pro
jecf; CIA was only involved in helping to write "black" contracts. 2~
Lockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having trouble
containing costs; Pratt & Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle.
In mid-1961, Pratt & Whitney overruns threatened to halt the entire
OXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the
office of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Richard Bissell asked the Navy
to assist in funding the 158's development. After hearing Bissell and
Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy air
craft, VAdm. William A. Schoech, Chief of the Navy Materiel
Command that had originally financed the 158 engine, authorized the
transfer of $38 million in end-of-year funds to the project, thus keep
ing the OXCARTs head above water.~9 As it turned out, the 158 was
never used in a Navy aircraft.
"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 46-47, 51-55 (TS Codeword); Minnich. "OXCART Story...
p. 10 (S).
"OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).
,, Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. p. 55 (TS Codeword). During this
period. Kelly Johnson was very disappointed with Pratt & Whitney·s work on the 158.
particularly when they shocked him in September 1961 with the news that the engine
would be overweight. underpowered. and late. Johnson, "Archangel log.'' 11 September
1961.
See, et NOFOAN
Chapter 6
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.