Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Mission Control”27 pages
285 to reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials de cided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No. 11 to the contract reduced from 12 to IO the number of A- l 2s, for a total cost of $16 l.2 million. 21 The cancellation of these two A- l 2s was offset by an Air Force order for the development of a supersonic interceptor variant of the A-12 to serve as a replacement for the North American F- l08A Rapier interceptor project, which had been canceled in late 1960. With the assistance of the Agency's west coast contracting office, the Air Force entered into an agreement with Lockheed to produce three AF-12 air craft, based on the A- I 2 design but modified to carry a second crew man and three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project KEDLOCK. The AF-12 (later redesignated the YF- l 2A) was de signed to intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the United States, and initial Air Force plans envisioned a force of up to I 00 of these supersonic interceptors. In fact, only three of these planes were built and delivered during the 1963-64 time frame because Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled the program as a cost-cut ting measure. The Air Force bore all of the costs of the YF-12A pro jecf; CIA was only involved in helping to write "black" contracts. 2~ Lockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having trouble containing costs; Pratt & Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle. In mid-1961, Pratt & Whitney overruns threatened to halt the entire OXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the office of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Richard Bissell asked the Navy to assist in funding the 158's development. After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy air craft, VAdm. William A. Schoech, Chief of the Navy Materiel Command that had originally financed the 158 engine, authorized the transfer of $38 million in end-of-year funds to the project, thus keep ing the OXCARTs head above water.~9 As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 46-47, 51-55 (TS Codeword); Minnich. "OXCART Story... p. 10 (S). "OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword). ,, Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. p. 55 (TS Codeword). During this period. Kelly Johnson was very disappointed with Pratt & Whitney·s work on the 158. particularly when they shocked him in September 1961 with the news that the engine would be overweight. underpowered. and late. Johnson, "Archangel log.'' 11 September 1961. See, et NOFOAN Chapter 6 Seeaet
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.