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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
285
to reduce expenditures. After much refiguring, project officials de
cided to decrease the number of deliverable aircraft. Amendment No.
11 to the contract reduced from 12 to IO the number of A- l 2s, for a
total cost of $16 l.2 million. 21
The cancellation of these two A- l 2s was offset by an Air Force
order for the development of a supersonic interceptor variant of the
A-12 to serve as a replacement for the North American F- l08A Rapier
interceptor project, which had been canceled in late 1960. With the
assistance of the Agency's west coast contracting office, the Air Force
entered into an agreement with Lockheed to produce three AF-12 air
craft, based on the A- I 2 design but modified to carry a second crew
man and three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project
KEDLOCK. The AF-12 (later redesignated the YF- l 2A) was de
signed to intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the
United States, and initial Air Force plans envisioned a force of up to
I 00 of these supersonic interceptors. In fact, only three of these planes
were built and delivered during the 1963-64 time frame because
Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled the program as a cost-cut
ting measure. The Air Force bore all of the costs of the YF-12A pro
jecf; CIA was only involved in helping to write "black" contracts. 2~
Lockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having trouble
containing costs; Pratt & Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle.
In mid-1961, Pratt & Whitney overruns threatened to halt the entire
OXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the
office of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Richard Bissell asked the Navy
to assist in funding the 158's development. After hearing Bissell and
Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy air
craft, VAdm. William A. Schoech, Chief of the Navy Materiel
Command that had originally financed the 158 engine, authorized the
transfer of $38 million in end-of-year funds to the project, thus keep
ing the OXCARTs head above water.~9 As it turned out, the 158 was
never used in a Navy aircraft.
"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 46-47, 51-55 (TS Codeword); Minnich. "OXCART Story...
p. 10 (S).
"OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).
,, Parangosky interview (S): OSA History. chap. 20. p. 55 (TS Codeword). During this
period. Kelly Johnson was very disappointed with Pratt & Whitney·s work on the 158.
particularly when they shocked him in September 1961 with the news that the engine
would be overweight. underpowered. and late. Johnson, "Archangel log.'' 11 September
1961.
See, et NOFOAN
Chapter 6
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.