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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
284
Geeret NOFORN
Chapter 6
storage capacity, and runway lelllgth were insufficient for the
OXCART program. the site 's remot,e location would greatly ease the
task of maintaining the program's security, and a moderate construc
tion program could provide adequate facilities. Construction began in
September 1960; a C-47 shuttle s,ervice ferried work crews from
Burbank to Las Vegas and from Las Vegas to the site.
The new 8,500-foot runway was completed by 15 November
1960. Kelly Johnson had been reluctant to have a standard Air Force
runway with expansion joints every 25 feet because he feared the
joints wou ld set up undesirable vibirations in the speedy aircraft At
his suggestion a 150-foot wide runway was therefore constructed of
six 25-foot-wide longitudinal sections, each 150 feet long but stag
gered. This layout put most of the expansion joints parallel to the di
rection of airer-aft roll and reduced the frequency of the joints.
Additional improvements included the resurfacing of 18 miles of
highway leading to the base so that heavy fuel trucks could bring in
the necessary fuel. The need for additional bui ldings on the base was
met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy hangars were dismantled.
mo\'ed, and reassembled on the north side of the:: base. and more than
100 surplus Navy housing buildings were also transported to Area 51.
All essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery
date of the first A- I 2 on I August 1961.~"
Unfortunately. this delivery date began to slip further and further
into the future. Delays in obtaining the titanium, and lacer the J58 en
gines. caused the postponement of the final assembly of the first plane.
Eventually, Kelly Johnson and Agency project offic ials decided to be
gin testing without waiting for the J58 engines by using Pratt &
Whitney J75/l 9W engines. designed for the Convair F- 1.06. to test the
A-12 at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6. Such
a change, however, meant that the engine compartment of the first air
craft had to be reconfigured to accommodate the J75 engine. Lockheed
hoped that this substitution would petrmit the delivery of the first A-12
by 22 December l 961 and its initial test flight by 27 February 1962.
L ockheed ran into so many technological problems with the
OXCART effort that by October 196 I its costs had swollen to $ 136
million and were still climbing. Something obviously had to be done
"· OSA History. chap. :!O. pp. 39-10. 4 ). 51 1TS CoJcword): Minnich. ··oxCART Story:·
pp. ,.9 (SJ.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.