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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
284
Geeret NOFORN
Chapter 6
storage capacity, and runway lelllgth were insufficient for the
OXCART program. the site 's remot,e location would greatly ease the
task of maintaining the program's security, and a moderate construc
tion program could provide adequate facilities. Construction began in
September 1960; a C-47 shuttle s,ervice ferried work crews from
Burbank to Las Vegas and from Las Vegas to the site.
The new 8,500-foot runway was completed by 15 November
1960. Kelly Johnson had been reluctant to have a standard Air Force
runway with expansion joints every 25 feet because he feared the
joints wou ld set up undesirable vibirations in the speedy aircraft At
his suggestion a 150-foot wide runway was therefore constructed of
six 25-foot-wide longitudinal sections, each 150 feet long but stag
gered. This layout put most of the expansion joints parallel to the di
rection of airer-aft roll and reduced the frequency of the joints.
Additional improvements included the resurfacing of 18 miles of
highway leading to the base so that heavy fuel trucks could bring in
the necessary fuel. The need for additional bui ldings on the base was
met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy hangars were dismantled.
mo\'ed, and reassembled on the north side of the:: base. and more than
100 surplus Navy housing buildings were also transported to Area 51.
All essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery
date of the first A- I 2 on I August 1961.~"
Unfortunately. this delivery date began to slip further and further
into the future. Delays in obtaining the titanium, and lacer the J58 en
gines. caused the postponement of the final assembly of the first plane.
Eventually, Kelly Johnson and Agency project offic ials decided to be
gin testing without waiting for the J58 engines by using Pratt &
Whitney J75/l 9W engines. designed for the Convair F- 1.06. to test the
A-12 at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6. Such
a change, however, meant that the engine compartment of the first air
craft had to be reconfigured to accommodate the J75 engine. Lockheed
hoped that this substitution would petrmit the delivery of the first A-12
by 22 December l 961 and its initial test flight by 27 February 1962.
L ockheed ran into so many technological problems with the
OXCART effort that by October 196 I its costs had swollen to $ 136
million and were still climbing. Something obviously had to be done
"· OSA History. chap. :!O. pp. 39-10. 4 ). 51 1TS CoJcword): Minnich. ··oxCART Story:·
pp. ,.9 (SJ.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.